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  “On	   the	   back	   of	   a	   cigarette	   packet”	   –	   standardised	   packaging	   legislation	  
and	  the	  tobacco	  industry’s	  fundamental	  right	  to	  (intellectual)	  property 




	  In	   Europe,	   over	   the	   last	   few	   years,	   the	   consumption	   of	   tobacco	   products	   has	  declined.1	  Nevertheless,	   large	   numbers	   of	   young	   people	   continue	   to	   become	  smokers.2	  In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   it	   is	   estimated	   that	   over	   200,000	   children	  between	   11	   and	   15	   take	   up	   this	   addictive	   habit	   each	   year.3	  This	   is	   a	   very	  significant	  public	  health	  problem	  because	  fifty	  per	  cent	  of	  long-­‐term	  smokers	  die	  from	   a	   smoking-­‐related	   disease.4 	  Such	   diseases	   are,	   by	   some	   distance,	   the	  primary	   cause	   of	   preventable	   morbidity	   and	   premature	   death	   in	   the	   United	  Kingdom.5	  Recently,	   standardised	   packaging	   (also	   known	   as	   plain	   packaging)6	  legislation	   has	   been	   adopted	   in	   some	   states	   as	   an	   additional	   tobacco	   control	  measure.7	  Under	   such	   laws,	   tobacco	   products	   must	   be	   sold	   in	   drab	   coloured	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Drafts	  of	  this	  paper	  were	  delivered	  at	  events	  organised	  by	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Institute	  (University	  of	  Groningen,	  May-­‐June	  2013),	  the	  Oxford	  Intellectual	  Property	  Research	  Centre	  (Invited	  Speaker	  Series,	  University	  of	  Oxford,	  February,	  2014),	  the	  eCoherence	  Project	  (University	  of	  Turku,	  June	  2014),	  the	  Intellectual	  Property	  Subject-­‐Section	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  Legal	  Scholars	  (University	  of	  Nottingham,	  September	  2014)	  and	  the	  Sheffield	  Institute	  of	  Corporate	  &	  Commercial	  Law	  (University	  of	  Sheffield,	  November	  2014).	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  all	  	  who	  provided	  questions	  and	  comments	  at	  those	  events.	  1	  However,	  the	  incidence	  of	  smoking	  is	  increasing	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world	  (particularly	  in	  developing	  countries).	  See	  P	  Cairney,	  ibid,	  3-­‐6.	  2	  C.Chantler,	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  –	  Report	  of	  the	  Independent	  
Review	  undertaken	  by	  Sir	  Cyril	  Chantler,	  April	  2014	  (“Chantler	  Report”),	  [3].	  3	  Chantler	  Report,	  4.	  4	  See	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products	  Regulations	  2015	  (“Explanatory	  Memorandum”),	  [7.1]-­‐[7.2.].	  5	  HM	  Government,	  Healthy	  Lives,	  Healthy	  People:	  a	  Tobacco	  Control	  Plan	  for	  
England,	  9	  March	  2011	  [5];	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  ibid	  [7.1].	  6	  The	  form	  of	  tobacco	  control	  measure	  discussed	  here	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “plain	  packaging”	  legislation	  in	  some	  contexts	  (see	  Australia’s	  Tobacco	  Plain	  Packaging	  Act	  2011	  (Cth)).	  More	  recently,	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EU,	  the	  term	  “standardised	  packaging”	  has	  been	  adopted.	  The	  shift	  in	  terminology	  recognises	  that	  product	  packaging	  under	  the	  legislation	  is	  not	  really	  “plain”	  at	  all	  because	  it	  carries	  prominent	  mandatory	  textual	  and	  graphic	  health	  warnings.	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  section	  1	  below..	  For	  discussion	  of	  tobacco	  control	  laws	  generally,	  see	  AD	  Mitchell	  &	  T	  Voon,	  The	  Global	  Tobacco	  Epidemic	  &	  the	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2014);	  P	  Cairney	  et	  al,	  Global	  Tobacco	  Control	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012);	  G	  Howells,	  
The	  Tobacco	  Challenge	  –	  Legal	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  (Ashgate,	  2011).	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packaging	  without	  branding	  other	   than	  a	  written	   indication	  of	   the	  name	  under	  which	  the	  product	  is	  sold.8	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  attraction	  of	  tobacco	  products,	  particularly	   to	   young	   smokers,	   and	   to	   prevent	   advertising	   imagery	   from	  interfering	  with	  prominent	  mandatory	  textual	  and	  visual	  health	  warnings.	  	  	  On	   19th	   March	   2015,	   the	   Standardised	   Packaging	   of	   Tobacco	   Products	  Regulations	  2015	   (“the	  Regulations”)9	  received	  Parliamentary	  approval10	  in	   the	  United	   Kingdom.11	  The	   tobacco	   industry	   (“the	   Industry”)	   vigorously	   opposed	  their	   introduction. 12 	  Amongst	   other	   objections,	   it	   has	   claimed	   that	   the	  restrictions	   on	   branding	   introduced	   under	   the	   Regulations	   violate	   its	  fundamental	  right	  of	  property	  under	  Art	  1	  of	  the	  First	  Protocol	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (“A1P1,	   ECHR”)	   and	   Art	   17	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	   the	  European	  Union	   (“Art	  17,	  EU	  Charter”)	  because	   the	  Regulations	   deprive	   it	   of	   its	   ability	   to	   use	   marks,	   designs	   and	   inventions	  protected	   by	   intellectual	   property	   law.	   In	   this	   article,	   I	   test	   this	   argument	   by	  reference	   to	   the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	   (ECtHR)	  and	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	  of	   the	  EU	  (CJEU).	   I	  demonstrate	   that	   the	  absolutist	  view	  of	  property	  rights	  promoted	  by	  the	  Industry	   is	  very	  different	   from	  that	  prevailing	  in	  European	  fundamental	  rights	  law	  and	  that,	  as	  a	  result,	  its	  suggestion	  that	  the	  Regulations	  violate	  A1P1	  and	  Art	  17	   is	  seriously	  misleading.	   It	   is	   important	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  further	  detail,	  see	  section	  1	  below.	  9	  SI	  2015/829	  (“Regulations”).	  10	  The	  Regulations	  are	  scheduled	  to	  come	  into	  force	  on	  20th	  May	  2016.	  This	  date	  coincides	  with	  the	  transposition	  deadline	  for	  the	  revised	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive	  (Directive	  2014/40/EU	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  the	  approximation	  of	  the	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  administrative	  provisions	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  concerning	  the	  manufacture,	  presentation	  and	  sale	  of	  tobacco	  and	  related	  products	  and	  repealing	  Directive	  2001/37/EC).	  Arts	  4,	  8,	  10	  and	  19	  of	  the	  Regulations	  implement	  Arts	  13	  and	  14	  and	  one	  element	  of	  Art	  9(3)	  of	  the	  Directive.	  Those	  Articles	  provide	  certain	  restrictions	  on	  the	  presentation	  and	  appearance	  of	  tobacco	  products	  and	  packaging	  and	  minimum	  amounts	  of	  tobacco	  or	  cigarettes	  per	  individual	  packet.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  State	  intends	  to	  introduce	  a	  further	  statutory	  instrument	  implementing	  the	  remaining	  provisions	  of	  the	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive.	  See	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  [4.3].	  11	  Even	  though	  public	  health	  is	  a	  devolved	  matter,	  agreement	  has	  been	  reached	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Regulations	  throughout	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  The	  Children	  and	  Families	  Act	  2014,	  which	  authorises	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  to	  introduce	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  provides	  that	  he	  or	  she	  obtains	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  governments	  of	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  before	  making	  regulations	  which	  would	  normally	  fall	  within	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  devolved	  administrations	  (s	  94(12)).	  The	  consent	  of	  the	  relevant	  Ministers	  has	  been	  obtained.	  See	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  supra,	  [5].	  	  12	  Groups	  and	  individuals	  outside	  the	  Industry	  (including	  grocers,	  packaging	  companies	  and	  libertarians)	  have	  also	  opposed	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Regulations.	  However,	  the	  Industry	  has	  been	  the	  leading	  proponent	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  violates	  the	  fundamental	  right	  of	  intellectual	  property	  and,	  for	  simplicity’s	  sake,	  the	  argument	  is	  therefore	  treated	  here	  as	  though	  it	  were	  the	  Industry’s	  alone.	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the	   Industry’s	   argument	   to	   be	   refuted	   in	   detail	   because	   it	   has	   been	   forcefully	  deployed	  in	  lobbying	  and	  has	  been	  widely	  recycled	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.13	  While	  the	  UK	  Government	  was	  not,	  ultimately,	  deterred	  from	  legislating,	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  Regulations	  has	  been	  challenged14	  and	  the	  same	  challenge	  will	  undoubtedly	  be	   raised	   when	   standardised	   packaging	   legislation	   is	   proposed	   elsewhere	   in	  Europe.15	  	  	  	  
1 The	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products	  Regulations	  2015	  	  At	   the	   international	   level,	   the	   World	   Health	   Organisation’s	   Tobacco	   Control	  Framework	   encourages,	   but	   does	   not	   require,	   contracting	   states	   to	   adopt	  standardised	   packaging	   laws.16	  Before	   2015,	   Australia	  was	   the	   only	   country	   to	  have	   done	   so.17	  Following	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Tobacco	   Plain	   Packaging	   Act	  2011	   (Cth),	   the	  Australian	   state	  has	   faced	  a	   series	  of	   legal	   challenges	   from	   the	  Industry	   and	   countries	   with	   aligned	   financial	   interests.	   In	   proceedings	   in	   the	  Australian	   courts,	   Japan	   Tobacco	   International	   argued	   unsuccessfully	   that	   the	  legislation	   violates	   their	   right	   of	   property	   under	   the	   Australian	   constitution18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  While	  counter-­‐arguments	  have	  been	  advanced,	  the	  claim	  has	  not	  been	  dissected	  in	  detail.	  	  It	  has	  been	  doubted	  in	  PK	  Henning	  &	  L	  Shmatenko	  in	  “Tobacco	  Control	  in	  Europe:	  the	  Potential	  for	  Plain	  Packaging”	  in	  AD	  Mitchell	  &	  T	  Voon,	  The	  Global	  Tobacco	  Epidemic	  and	  the	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2014)	  187;	  A	  Alemanno	  &	  E	  Bonadio,	  “Plain	  packaging	  of	  cigarettes	  under	  EU	  law”	  in	  T	  Voon	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Public	  Health	  and	  Plain	  Packaging	  of	  Cigarettes	  –	  Legal	  Issues	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2012)	  214,	  232-­‐3;	  A	  Alemanno	  &	  A	  Garde,	  “Legal	  Opinion	  on	  the	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  UK	  proposals	  to	  Introduce	  Standardised	  Packaging	  on	  Tobacco	  Products	  with	  the	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”,	  provided	  for	  Action	  on	  Smoking	  &	  Health	  (ASH),	  2014,	  41-­‐2.	   14	  Inter	  alia,	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  of	  property.	  See	  C	  Cooper,	  “Tobacco	  Companies	  File	  Lawsuits	  against	  UK	  Government	  over	  Plain	  Packaging	  Laws”,	  
The	  Independent,	  22nd	  May	  2015.	  15	  The	  French	  government	  is	  currently	  attempting	  to	  introduce	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  (with	  effect	  from	  May	  2016).	  See	  “French	  Tobacconists	  Dump	  Four	  Tonnes	  of	  Carrots	  on	  Street	  in	  Cigarette	  Protest”,	  The	  Guardian,	  22nd	  July	  2015.	  16	  See	  World	  Health	  Organisation,	  Guidelines	  for	  implementation	  of	  Art	  11	  of	  the	  
WHO	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Tobacco	  Control,	  Decision	  FCTC/COP3(10),	  [46]	  and	  Guidelines	  for	  implementation	  of	  Art	  11	  of	  the	  WHO	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  
Tobacco	  Control,	  Decision	  FCTC/COP3(12),	  [16].	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  WHO	  Framework	  Convention,	  see	  P	  Cairney	  et	  al,	  Global	  Tobacco	  Control:	  Power,	  
Policy,	  Governance	  &	  Transfer	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012),	  189-­‐211;	  chapters	  by	  K	  DeLand	  et	  al,	  C	  Lo	  &	  J	  Liberman	  in	  AD	  Mitchell	  &	  T	  Voon	  (eds),	  The	  Global	  
Tobacco	  Epidemic	  and	  the	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2014)	  11-­‐31;	  32-­‐47;	  48-­‐63.	  17	  Tobacco	  Plain	  Packaging	  Act	  2011	  (Cth).	  18	  JT	  International	  SA	  v	  Commonwealth	  (2012)	  291	  ALR	  669.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  M	  Davison,	  “Tobacco	  Control	  in	  Australia:	  the	  High	  Court	  challenge	  to	  plain	  packaging”	  in	  AD	  Mitchell	  &	  T	  Voon,	  The	  Global	  Tobacco	  Epidemic	  and	  the	  Law	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2014)	  258;	  S	  Ricketson,	  “Plain	  Packaging	  Legislation	  for	  Tobacco	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Internationally,	   a	   number	  of	   states	  have	  brought	  proceedings	  under	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement19	  and	  Philip	  Morris	  Asia	  Ltd	  has	  brought	  a	  claim	  under	  an	  investment	  treaty	   between	   Australia	   and	   Hong	   Kong,	   alleging	   that	   Australia	   has	  expropriated	   Philip	   Morris’s	   investments	   (represented	   by	   its	   intellectual	  property	   rights).20	  The	   TRIPS	   and	   investment	   treaty	   claims	   have	   not	   yet	   been	  resolved.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Products	  and	  Trade	  Marks	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia”	  (2013)	  Queen	  Mary	  
Journal	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  224.	  Section	  51(xxxi)	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  constitution	  provides	  that	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  “acquisition”	  of	  property	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  other	  than	  on	  “just	  terms”.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  held	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  had	  not	  “acquired”	  the	  trade	  mark	  owner’s	  property.	  See	  S	  Evans	  &	  J	  Bosland,	  “Plain	  Packaging	  of	  Cigarettes	  and	  Constitutional	  Property	  Rights”	  in	  T	  Voon	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Public	  Health	  and	  Plain	  Packaging	  of	  
Cigarettes	  –	  Legal	  Issues	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2012)	  (predicting	  that	  the	  legislation	  would	  be	  held	  to	  be	  constitutional).	  	  19	  See	  Australia	  –	  Certain	  Measures	  concerning	  Trademarks,	  Geographical	  
Indications	  and	  other	  Plain	  Packaging	  Requirements	  Applicable	  to	  Tobacco	  
Products	  and	  Packaging	  (Honduras)	  WT/DS435;	  Australia	  –	  Certain	  Measures	  
concerning	  Trademarks,	  Geographical	  Indications	  and	  other	  Plain	  Packaging	  
Requirements	  Applicable	  to	  Tobacco	  Products	  and	  Packaging	  (Dominican	  Republic)	  WT/DS441,	  Australia	  –	  Certain	  Measures	  concerning	  Trademarks,	  
Geographical	  Indications	  and	  other	  Plain	  Packaging	  Requirements	  Applicable	  to	  
Tobacco	  Products	  and	  Packaging	  (Cuba)	  WT/DS458;	  Australia	  –	  Certain	  Measures	  
Concerning	  Trademarks,	  Geographical	  Indications	  and	  other	  Plain	  Packaging	  
Requirements	  applicable	  to	  Tobacco	  Products	  and	  Packaging	  (Indonesia)	  WT/DS467.	  Ukraine	  also	  filed	  an	  application	  against	  Australia	  for	  violation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  on	  similar	  grounds,	  but	  has	  subsequently	  withdrawn	  the	  complaint	  (see	  “Ukraine’s	  Decision	  to	  Withdraw	  its	  Complaint	  at	  WTO:	  an	  Evidence-­‐Based	  Move”,	  WHO	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Tobacco	  Control,	  9th	  June	  2015,	  available	  at:	  http://www.who.int/fctc/mediacentre/news/2015/ukrainestmnt/en/.	  There	  is	  an	  extensive	  literature	  on	  these	  disputes.	  See,	  for	  example,	  S	  Frankel	  &	  D	  A	  Marsoof,	  “The	  TRIPS	  Compatibility	  of	  Australia’s	  Tobacco	  Plain	  Packaging	  Legislation”	  (2013)	  16	  Journal	  of	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  197;	  “Plain	  Packaging	  and	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement”	  (2013)	  46	  Vanderbilt	  Journal	  of	  Transnational	  Law	  1149;	  M	  Davison,	  “The	  Legitimacy	  of	  Plain	  Packaging	  under	  International	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law:	  Why	  there	  is	  no	  Right	  to	  Use	  a	  Trademark	  under	  either	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  or	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement”	  in	  T	  Voon	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Public	  Health	  and	  Plain	  Packaging	  of	  Cigarettes	  –	  Legal	  
Issues	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2012)	  81-­‐108;	  P	  Johnson,	  “Trade	  Marks	  without	  a	  Brand:	  the	  Proposals	  on	  ‘Plain	  Packaging’	  of	  Tobacco	  Products”	  [2012]	  European	  Intellectual	  Property	  Review	  46;	  M	  Davison,	  “Plain	  Packaging	  and	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement:	  a	  Response	  to	  Professor	  Gervais”	  (2013)	  Australian	  Intellectual	  Property	  Journal	  160.	  20	  Agreement	  Between	  the	  Government	  of	  Australia	  and	  the	  Government	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  of	  Investments,	  Austl.-­‐H.K.,	  Sept.	  15,	  1993,	  1748	  UNTS	  385.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  claim,	  see	  T	  Voon	  &	  A	  Mitchell,	  “Implications	  of	  International	  Investment	  Law	  for	  Plain	  Tobacco	  Packaging:	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  Within	   the	   EU,	   the	   revised	   Tobacco	   Products	   Directive	   imposes	   stringent	  controls	   on	   the	   advertising	   and	   presentation	   of	   tobacco	   products.	   However,	  despite	   attempts	   to	   amend	   the	  Directive	   during	   the	   legislative	   process,	   it	   does	  not	  require	  the	  introduction	  of	  a,	  standardised	  packaging	  regime.21	  Nevertheless,	  this	   option	   is	   explicitly	   left	   open	   to	   member	   states,	   provided	   the	   existence	   of	  such	  a	  regime	  at	  national	  level	  would	  be	  “compatible	  with	  the	  TFEU,	  with	  WTO	  obligations	   and	   [would]	   not	   affect	   the	   full	   application	   of	   [the]	  Directive”.22	  The	  Industry,	  and	  others,	  have	  challenged	  the	  revised	  Directive’s	  legality,	  questioning	  its	  legal	  basis	  and	  compatibility	  with	  various	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  EU	  law.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  lessons	  from	  the	  Hong	  Kong-­‐Australia	  BIT”,	  in	  T	  Voon	  et	  al	  (eds)	  Public	  Health	  
and	  Plain	  Packaging	  of	  Cigarettes	  –	  Legal	  Issues	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2012)	  137.	  Philip	  Morris	  has	  also	  brought	  proceedings	  against	  Uruguay	  over	  tobacco	  packaging	  requirements	  (falling	  short	  of	  standardised	  packaging)	  under	  a	  bilateral	  investment	  treaty	  between	  Switzerland	  and	  Uruguay.	  See	  B	  McGrady,	  “Implications	  of	  Ongoing	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Disputes	  concerning	  Tobacco,	  
Philip	  Morris	  v	  Uruguay”	  in	  T	  Voon	  et	  al	  (eds)	  Public	  Health	  and	  Plain	  Packaging	  
of	  Cigarettes	  –	  Legal	  Issues	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2012)	  173.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  cases	  from	  a	  political	  scientist’s	  perspective,	  see	  H	  Jarman,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Trade	  &	  
Tobacco	  Control	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan)	  2014.	  For	  discussion	  of	  a	  further	  dispute	  in	  which	  a	  state’s	  intellectual	  property	  rules	  have	  been	  argued	  to	  contravene	  investment	  protection	  provisions,	  see	  R	  Okediji,	  “Is	  Intellectual	  Property	  ‘Investment’?	  Eli	  Lilly	  v	  Canada	  and	  the	  International	  Intellectual	  Property	  System”	  (2014)	  35	  Univ	  of	  Pennsylvania	  J	  of	  Int	  Law	  1121.	  	  	  	  21	  Directive	  2014/40/EU	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  3	  April	  2014	  on	  the	  approximation	  of	  the	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  administrative	  provisions	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  concerning	  the	  manufacture,	  presentation	  and	  sale	  of	  tobacco	  and	  related	  products	  and	  repealing	  Directive	  2001/37/EC.	  The	  Directive,	  which	  requires	  combined	  picture	  and	  text	  health	  warnings	  to	  cover	  65%	  of	  the	  front	  and	  the	  back	  of	  the	  packaging	  of	  tobacco	  products	  for	  smoking,	  must	  be	  implemented	  by	  20	  May	  2016.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  Proposal	  to	  revise	  the	  Directive,	  see	  A	  Alemanno,	  “Out	  of	  Sight,	  Out	  of	  Mind	  –	  Towards	  a	  New	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”	  (2012)	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  197;	  MJ	  Elsmore	  &	  V	  Obolevich,	  “Thank	  You	  for	  Not	  Smoking:	  the	  Commission’s	  Proposal	  for	  a	  New	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive	  –	  Legally	  Sound	  but	  Does	  it	  Hit	  the	  Spot?	  (2013)	  European	  Law	  Review	  552.	  An	  amendment	  requiring	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  full,	  standardised	  packaging	  regime	  within	  the	  Directive	  was	  proposed,	  and	  rejected,	  during	  the	  legislative	  process,	  see	  A	  Alemanno	  &	  A	  Garde,	  “Legal	  Opinion	  on	  the	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  UK	  Proposals	  to	  Introduce	  Standardised	  Packaging	  on	  Tobacco	  Products	  with	  the	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”,	  provided	  for	  Action	  on	  Smoking	  &	  Health	  (ASH),	  2014,	  22-­‐3.	  22	  See	  Recital	  53.	  	  	  23	  See	  the	  references	  for	  preliminary	  ruling	  in	  (C-­‐358/14)	  Republic	  of	  Poland	  v	  
European	  Parliament	  and	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union;	  (C-­‐477/14)	  Pillbox	  38	  
(UK)	  Ltd	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  	  (including	  a	  claimed	  violation	  of	  Art	  17);	  (C-­‐547/14)	  Philip	  Morris	  Brands	  SARL	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  directive,	  see	  A	  Alemanno,	  “Out	  of	  Sight,	  Out	  of	  Mind	  –	  Towards	  a	  New	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”	  (2012)	  Columbia	  Journal	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The	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   Ireland 24 	  have	   nevertheless	   recently	   enacted	  standardised	  packaging	  regimes.	  Other	  European	  states	  plan	  to	  do	  so.25	  	  	  In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   the	   legislative	   process	   leading	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  Regulations	  was	  protracted.	  Following	  an	  initial	  consultation	  process	  (“the	  2012	  consultation”)26	  and	   an	   apparent	   faltering	   of	   legislative	   will,	   a	   provision	   was	  inserted	  in	  the	  Children	  and	  Families	  Act	  2014	  authorising	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	   Health	   to	   make	   regulations	   concerning	   the	   retail	   packaging	   of	   tobacco	  products	  if	  he	  or	  she	  considers	  they	  may	  contribute	  at	  any	  time	  to	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  to,	  or	  promoting,	   the	  health	  or	  welfare	  of	  people	  under	   the	  age	  of	  18.27	  Following	   the	   introduction	   of	   this	   provision,	   the	   government	   sought	   an	  independent	   review	   of	   the	   scientific	   evidence	   on	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  standardized	  packaging	  legislation	  from	  the	  paediatrician,	  Sir	  Cyril	  Chantler.	  His	  report	   concluded	   that,	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	  existing	   tobacco	  control	   regime,	  such	   legislation	   was	   “very	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   modest	   but	   important	   reduction	  over	   time	   on	   the	   uptake	   and	   prevalence	   of	   smoking	   and	   thus	   have	   a	   positive	  impact	   on	   public	   health”. 28 	  Following	   further	   consultation	   (“the	   2014	  consultation”), 29 	  the	   Regulations	   were	   tabled	   and	   received	   Parliamentary	  approval.	   Their	   aims,	   which	   are	   set	   out	   in	   an	   accompanying	   explanatory	  memorandum,	  are;	  first,	  to	  discourage	  young	  people	  from	  starting	  to	  use	  tobacco	  products;	   secondly,	   to	   encourage	   people	   to	   give	   up	   using	   tobacco	   products;	  thirdly,	   to	   reduce	   the	  appeal	  or	  attractiveness	  of	   tobacco	  products;	   fourthly,	   to	  reduce	  the	  misleading	  elements	  of	  packaging	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  packaging	  to	  detract	   from	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  health	  warnings	  and,	   finally,	   to	  alter	  attitudes,	  beliefs,	   intentions	   and	   behaviour	   relating	   to	   the	   reduction	   in	   use	   of	   tobacco	  products.30	  	  The	  Regulations	  pursue	  these	  goals	  through	  a	  series	  of	  stringent	  controls	  on	  the	  packaging	  of	   cigarettes	  and	  hand-­‐rolling	   tobacco.31	  External	  packaging	  surfaces	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  European	  Law	  197;	  A	  Alemanno	  &	  A	  Garde,	  “Legal	  Opinion	  on	  the	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  UK	  Proposals	  to	  Introduce	  Standardised	  Packaging	  on	  Tobacco	  Products	  with	  the	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”,	  provided	  for	  Action	  on	  Smoking	  &	  Health	  (ASH),	  2014	  24	  See	  Public	  Health	  (Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco)	  Act	  2015.	  The	  Industry	  has	  sought	  judicial	  review	  of	  this	  legislation.	  See	  A	  O’Faolain,	  “State	  Wants	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  Challenge	  Referred	  to	  EU	  Court”,	  Irish	  Times,	  27th	  April	  2015.	  	  25	  In	  France,	  for	  example,	  see	  “Le	  paquet	  de	  cigarettes	  neutre	  sera	  obligatoire	  en	  mai	  2016”,	  Le	  Figaro,	  3rd	  April	  2015.	  26	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Consultation	  on	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  
Products,	  16th	  April	  2012.	  27	  Children	  and	  Families	  Act	  2014,	  s	  94.	  28	  Chantler	  Report,	  supra,	  6.	  29	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Welsh	  Government,	  Scottish	  Government,	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Social	  Services	  &	  Public	  Safety	  (NI)	  Consultation	  on	  the	  Introduction	  of	  
Regulations	  for	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  June	  2014.	  30	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  [7.3].	  31	  The	  Regulations	  do	  not	  cover	  pipes	  or	  cigars,	  which	  are	  not	  generally	  used	  by	  young	  people	  (e.g.	  pipes	  and	  cigars).	  See	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  7.11.	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must	  be	  presented	   in	  a	   specific	  dull	  brown	  colour32	  and	   internal	   surfaces	  must	  either	  be	  white	  or	  the	  same	  dull	  brown.33	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  health	  warnings	  and	   other	   statutorily	   prescribed	   information,	   the	   only	   distinguishing	   text	  permitted	  on	   the	  packaging	  of	  products	   covered	  by	   the	   legislation	   is	   a	  brand34	  and	  variant	  name.35	  The	  font	  and	  maximum	  size	  of	  this	  text	  is	  specified.36	  Equally	  restrictive	   conditions	   are	   imposed	   on	   the	   presentation	   of	   cigarettes	  themselves.37	  Further	   constraints	   relating	   to	   the	   required	  materials,	   shape	   and	  type	   of	   packaging	   for	   tobacco	   products	   are	   designed	   to	   eradicate	   all	   other	  opportunities	  for	  product	  differentiation.38	  These	  packaging	  requirements	  apply	  only	   to	   packaging	   intended	   for	   consumers).39	  Breach	   of	   the	   Regulations	   is	   a	  criminal	  offence40	  and	  no	  compensation	  is	  payable	  to	  those	  whose	  interests	  are	  adversely	   affected.	   A	   short	   transitional	   period	   is	   provided,	   during	   which	   non-­‐compliant	   products	   produced	   before	   the	   date	   on	   which	   the	   Regulations	   come	  into	  force	  can	  continue	  to	  be	  sold.41	  	  The	   Regulations	   also	   include	   provisions	   designed	   to	   preserve	   the	   existence	   of	  intellectual	   property	   rights	   in	   the	   Industry’s	   brand	   signs,	   despite	   the	   severe	  controls	  placed	  on	  their	  use.	  They	  include	  measures	  providing	  that	  trade	  marks	  and	  designs	  relating	  to	  tobacco	  products	  may	  still	  be	  registered	  even	  though	  they	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  tobacco	  products	  under	  the	  legislation.42	  	  They	  also	  ensure	  that	  a	  trade	  mark	  proprietor’s	  failure	  to	  use	  a	  registered	  trade	  mark	  relating	  to	  tobacco	   products	  will	   not	   result	   in	   the	   revocation	   of	   the	  mark	  where	   non-­‐use	  arises	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Regulations.43	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Pantone	  448	  C.	  See	  Regulations,	  Reg	  3(2).	  	  33	  Reg	  3	  (cigarettes);	  Reg	  7	  (hand	  rolling	  tobacco).	  See	  also	  Schedules	  1-­‐4	  for	  further	  detail	  of	  the	  text	  and	  other	  markings	  permitted	  on	  the	  packaging	  of	  cigarettes	  and	  hand-­‐rolling	  tobacco.	  34	  “Brand	  name”	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  primary	  name	  by	  which	  the	  product	  is	  known”	  (Reg	  2(1)).	  35	  “Variant	  name”	  is	  defined	  as	  “any	  name	  by	  which	  that	  product	  is	  distinguished	  from	  other	  tobacco	  products	  under	  the	  same	  brand	  name”	  (Reg	  2(1)).	  36	  Sch	  1	  (cigarettes);	  Sch	  3	  (hand	  rolling	  tobacco).	  37	  Reg	  5.	  38	  Reg	  4	  (cigarettes);	  Reg	  8	  (hand-­‐rolling	  tobacco);	  Regs	  10-­‐12;	  Sch	  2.	  39	  See	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  7.10.	  40	  Reg	  15.	  41	  Reg	  20.	  42	  Regs	  13(1)-­‐(3)	  (trade	  marks);	  14	  (designs).	  43	  Reg	  13(4)-­‐(8).	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2 The	  Tobacco	  Industry’s	  challenge	  to	  the	  Regulations	  	  The	   Industry	   has	   raised	   a	   number	   of	   objections	   to	   the	   Regulations.	   It	   has,	   for	  example,	  argued	  that	  branding	  encourages	  existing	  smokers	  to	  switch	  suppliers	  but	  does	  not	  cause	  young	  people	   to	  begin	  smoking.44	  It	  has	  also	  suggested	   that	  there	  is	  insufficient	  evidence	  that	  the	  Regulations	  will	  achieve	  their	  stated	  aim.	  45	  	  The	  Australian	   experience	  of	   standardised	  packaging	  has	   formed	  an	   important	  battleground	   in	   this	   respect. 46 	  The	   Industry	   has	   proposed	   that	   alternative	  policies	  (including	  education)	  would	  combat	  the	  incidence	  of	  smoking	  by	  young	  people	   more	   effectively47	  and	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   standardised	   packaging	  legislation	  will	  have	  a	  number	  of	  negative	  consequences,	  including	  an	  increase	  in	  the	   counterfeit	   tobacco	   trade,	   with	   a	   resulting	   impact	   on	   the	   businesses	   of	  grocers,	   newsagents	   and	   packaging	   manufacturers	   and	   a	   reduction	   in	   tax	  revenue.48	  The	   Industry	  has	   further	  warned	   that	   the	  Regulations	  will	  harm	   the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  commercial	  environment.49	  	  These	   arguments	   present	   standardised	   packaging	   legislation	   as	   a	   poor	   policy	  choice.	  However,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  claimed	  that	  the	  Regulations	  are	  unlawful	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.	  The	  Industry	  has	  suggested	  (i)	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  will	  be	  vulnerable	   to	  TRIPS	   challenges	   similar	   to	   those	  brought	   against	  Australia;50	  (ii)	   that	   the	   introduction	  of	   standardised	  packaging	   legislation	   in	   an	   individual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  See,	  for	  example,	  JTI’s	  Response	  to	  the	  UK	  Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  
the	  Introduction	  of	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  
Products,	  6	  August	  2014	  [4.5]-­‐[4.21].	  This	  argument	  was	  considered	  by	  Sir	  Cyril	  Chantler	  in	  his	  review	  of	  the	  evidence	  on	  standardised	  packaging	  and	  considered	  to	  be	  	  “implausible”.	  See	  Chantler	  Report,	  [8].	  45	  See,	  for	  example,	  JTI’s	  Response	  to	  the	  UK	  Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  
the	  Introduction	  of	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  
Products,	  Ibid	  3-­‐4.	  	  46	  See,	  for	  example,	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd,	  Response	  of	  British	  
American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd	  to	  the	  2014	  Consultation,	  [2.1],	  [2.6].	  47	  	  See	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  [7.4];	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Health	  &	  Children,	  Houses	  of	  the	  Oireachtas	  (Ireland),	  Report	  on	  Hearings	  in	  Relation	  to	  the	  General	  Scheme	  of	  the	  Public	  health	  (Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco)	  Bill,	  April	  2014,	  Vol	  1,	  186-­‐8	  (Evidence	  of	  Andrew	  Meagher,	  John	  Player	  &	  Sons).	  	  48	  For	  a	  list	  of	  a	  number	  of	  suggested	  adverse	  consequences,	  see	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd,	  Response	  of	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd	  to	  the	  
2014	  Consultation,	  supra	  [2.4].	  	  49	  See	  Imperial	  Tobacco,	  Illegal,	  Unnecessary	  &	  Damaging	  for	  UK	  plc:	  Why	  
Standardised	  Packaging	  is	  a	  Bad	  Policy	  Idea	  that	  would	  not	  Work,	  7	  August	  2014.	  For	  an	  extraordinary,	  institutionalised	  expression	  of	  this	  concern,	  see	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Global	  IPLC	  International	  Index,	  3rd	  ed,	  February	  2015.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce’s	  global	  lobbying	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Industry,	  see	  D	  Hakim,	  “US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  Works	  Globally	  to	  Fight	  Antismoking	  Measures”,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  30	  June	  2015.	  50	  See	  “British	  American	  Tobacco	  will	  Launch	  Legal	  Challenge	  over	  Plain	  Packaging	  in	  the	  UK”,	  News	  Release,	  British	  American	  Tobacco,	  11th	  March	  2015.	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member	  state	  (such	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  or	  Ireland)	  breaches	  EU	  Treaty	  rules	  on	  competition51	  and/or	   free	  of	  movement	  of	  goods;52	  (iii)	   that	   the	  Regulations	  violate	  the	  Community	  Trade	  Mark	  Regulation53	  and	  (iv)	  that	  they	  contravene	  a	  number	   of	   fundamental	   principles	   and	   rights	   protected	   in	   the	   European	   legal	  order,	  including	  the	  right	  of	  commercial	  expression54	  and	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business. 55 	  Amongst	   the	   challenges	   based	   on	   fundamental	   rights,	   the	   most	  forcefully	   advanced	  has	  been	   the	   claim	   that	   standardised	  packaging	   legislation	  violates	   the	   Industry’s	   right	   to	   property	   (and,	   in	   particular,	   its	   right	   to	  intellectual	  property).	  This	  was	  repeatedly	  suggested	  in	  submissions	  to	  both	  the	  2012	   and	   2014	   consultations	   and	   was	   reiterated	   when	   the	   UK	   Government	  decided	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	   legislation.	  The	  argument	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  impact	  on	  the	  Industry’s	  registered	  trade	  marks,	  but	  also	  covers	  its	  unregistered	  marks,	  copyright,	  designs	  and	  patents	  in	  packaging	  technology.	  56	  	  Sometimes,	   this	   claim	   has	   been	   made	   in	   general,	   rhetorical	   terms.	   Thus,	   for	  example,	   when	   the	   Regulations	   received	   final	   Parliamentary	   approval,	   BAT’s	  “Corporate	  and	  Regulatory	  Affairs	  Director”	  stated	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  See,	  for	  example,	  Imperial	  Tobacco,	  Illegal,	  Unnecessary	  &	  Damaging	  for	  UK	  plc:	  
Why	  Standardised	  Packaging	  is	  a	  Bad	  Policy	  Idea	  that	  would	  not	  Work,	  7	  August	  2014,	  51.	  52	  See,	  for	  example,	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Response	  to	  the	  Consultation	  on	  
“Standardised	  Packaging”,	  7	  August	  2014,	  12-­‐13.	  53	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  Regulations	  would	  violate	  European	  trade	  mark	  law,	  see	  A	  Alemanno	  &	  A	  Garde,	  “Legal	  Opinion	  on	  the	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  UK	  Proposals	  to	  Introduce	  Standardised	  Packaging	  on	  Tobacco	  Products	  with	  the	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”,	  provided	  for	  Action	  on	  Smoking	  &	  Health	  (ASH),	  2014,	  37-­‐40,	  available	  at	  http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_955.pdf	  	  54	  See,	  for	  example,	  JTI’s	  Response	  to	  the	  UK	  Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  
the	  Introduction	  of	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  
Products,	  6	  August	  2014,	  19.	  This	  challenge	  has	  been	  advanced	  previously	  in	  relation	  to	  tobacco	  advertising	  controls	  in	  Europe.	  See,	  for	  example	  (C-­‐380/03)	  
Germany	  v	  Parliament	  &	  Council	  [153]-­‐[156].	  In	  New	  Zealand,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  codified	  fundamental	  right	  of	  property,	  the	  Industry	  has	  also	  claimed	  that	  standardised	  packaging	  would	  violate	  its	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  speech.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Imperial	  Tobacco	  New	  Zealand	  Ltd,	  Submission	  to	  the	  Health	  Committee	  on	  the	  Smokefree	  Environments	  (Tobacco	  Plain	  Packaging)	  Amendment	  Bill,	  2014,	  5.	  55	  See,	  for	  example,	  Imperial	  Tobacco,	  Illegal,	  Unnecessary	  &	  Damaging	  for	  UK	  plc:	  
Why	  Standardised	  Packaging	  is	  a	  Bad	  Policy	  Idea	  that	  would	  not	  Work,	  7	  August	  2014,	  50.	  The	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  is	  protected	  under	  Art	  16,	  EU	  Charter.	  56	  See,	  for	  example,	  W	  Pors	  &	  M	  Rieger-­‐Jansen,	  Bird	  &	  Bird,	  Paper	  regarding	  the	  
Legality	  of	  Plain	  Packaging	  and	  other	  Pack	  Standardization	  Measures	  in	  the	  
Netherlands,	  Paper	  prepared	  for	  Philip	  Morris	  Benelux	  BVBA,	  28	  May	  2013,	  14-­‐15;	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Standardised	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  will	  Harm	  Public	  Health	  
and	  Cost	  UK	  Taxpayers	  Billions:	  a	  Response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  
Consultation	  on	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  9	  August	  2012,	  24-­‐25.	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“This	  legislation	  is	  a	  case	  of	  the	  UK	  Government	  taking	  property	  from	  a	  UK	  business	  without	  paying	  for	  it.”57	  	  However,	  the	  Industry	  has	  also	  argued	  more	  specifically	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  would	  contravene	  the	  binding	  guarantees	  for	  property	   (and	  particularly	   intellectual	  property)	  provided	  under	  A1P1	  and	  Art	  17.	   58 	  Thus,	   for	   example,	   in	   its	   response	   to	   the	   2014	   Consultation,	   British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd	  wrote	  that:	  	   “Plain	  Packaging	  is	  per	  se	  unlawful,	  since	  it	  amounts	  to	  a	  complete	  deprivation	  of	  property	  without	  compensation	  contrary	  to	  Article	  1	  of	  Protocol	  1	  to	  the	  ECHR.”59	  	  In	   these	   specific	   claims,	   the	   Industry	   suggests	   that	   standardised	   packaging	  legislation	  prevents	   the	  application	  of	   its	  brand	  marks	  and	  signs	   (protected	  by	  intellectual	   property	   rights)	   to	   such	   a	   significant	   extent	   that	   it	   is	   effectively	  “deprived”	   of	   those	   rights	   and,	   as	   the	   Regulations	   make	   no	   provision	   for	  compensation,	   such	   deprivation	   of	   property	   rights	   violates	  A1P1	   and	  Art	   17.60	  These	  arguments	  have	  been	  echoed	  in	  the	  media	  and	  in	  legal	  commentary,	  with	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degrees	  of	  conviction	  and	  co-­‐ordination.61	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  “British	  American	  Tobacco	  will	  Launch	  Legal	  Challenge	  over	  Plain	  Packaging	  in	  the	  UK”,	  News	  Release,	  British	  American	  Tobacco,	  11th	  March	  2015.	  Sometimes,	  the	  Industry	  has	  presented	  this	  alleged	  expropriation	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  nation’s	  reputation	  for	  economic	  stability	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  See,	  for	  example,	  US	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce,	  Global	  IPLC	  International	  Index,	  3rd	  ed,	  February	  2015;	  Law	  Society	  of	  Ireland,	  Opening	  Remarks	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Ireland,	  Mr	  John	  P	  Shaw,	  to	  the	  Joint	  Oireachtas	  Committee	  on	  Health	  &	  Children,	  13th	  February	  2014.	  For	  criticism	  of	  the	  application	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  arguments	  in	  relation	  to	  property	  regulation,	  see	  J	  Waldron,	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  the	  Measure	  
of	  Property	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  58	  See,	  for	  example,	  Imperial	  Tobacco,	  Illegal,	  Unnecessary	  &	  Damaging	  for	  UK	  plc:	  
Why	  Standardised	  Packaging	  is	  a	  Bad	  Policy	  Idea	  that	  would	  not	  Work,	  7	  August	  2014	  [3.2]-­‐[3.3];	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Response	  to	  the	  Consultation	  on	  “Standardised	  
Packaging”,	  7	  August	  2014,	  3-­‐4.	  59	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd,	  Response	  of	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd	  
to	  the	  2014	  Consultation,	  28.	  60	  This	  argument	  was	  supported	  by	  Lord	  Hoffmann	  in	  an	  Opinion	  commissioned	  by	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd	  and	  appended	  to	  that	  company’s	  submission	  to	  the	  2012	  consultation.	  See	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Standardised	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  will	  Harm	  
Public	  Health	  and	  Cost	  UK	  Taxpayers	  Billions:	  a	  Response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  
Health	  Consultation	  on	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  9	  August	  2012,	  Appendix	  5.	  61	  See	  for	  example,	  R	  Taylor,	  “Cigarette	  Packaging”,	  Law	  Society	  Gazette,	  19th	  January	  2015;	  CR	  Zocco,	  “Plain	  Packaging:	  a	  Growing	  Threat	  to	  Trademark	  Rights”,	  Les	  Nouvelles:	  The	  Journal	  of	  the	  Licensing	  Society	  International,	  June	  2013,	  140;	  C	  Morcom,	  Trademarks,	  Tobacco	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  Trademark	  
World,	  No.	  210	  (September	  2008),	  20-­‐21;	  B	  Goebel,	  “Trademarks	  as	  Fundamental	  Rights—Europe”	  (2009)	  99	  Trademark	  Reporter	  931,	  950-­‐953.	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  If	  the	  Industry	  is	  correct	  in	  this	  claim	  that	  the	  fundamental	  guarantee	  of	  property	  rights	  within	   the	  European	   legal	   order	  has	  been	  breached,	   the	  Regulations	   (or	  the	   relevant	  provisions	  of	   the	  Regulations)	  will	  be	  quashed..	  Under	   the	  Human	  Rights	   Act	   1998,	   secondary	   legislation	  must	   comply	   with	   the	   rights	   protected	  under	   the	   ECHR	   (including	   A1P1).62	  Any	   challenge	   to	   the	   Regulations	   on	   this	  basis	   will	   be	   brought	   by	   means	   of	   an	   application	   for	   judicial	   review.63	  If	   the	  Industry	  is	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  outcome	  of	  such	  proceedings,	  it	  will	  potentially	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  an	  application	  at	  Strasbourg	  for	  alleged	  violation	  of	  A1P1.	  	  
	  The	  legal	  structure	  within	  which	  the	  claim	  for	  violation	  of	  Art	  17	  would	  be	  tested	  is	   more	   complex.	   Following	   the	   coming	   into	   force	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	   the	  Charter	   has	   the	   same	   status	   as	   the	   founding	   EU	   Treaties.64 	  All	   secondary	  legislation	   passed	   by	   EU	   institutions	   must	   be	   compatible	   with	   the	   rights	  protected	  under	  the	  Charter65	  and	  member	  states	  must	  ensure	  that	  they	  comply	  with	   those	   rights	  when	   they	   act	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   EU	   law.	  66	  There	   has	   been	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  a	  state	  will	  act	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	   law,	   particularly	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   Lisbon	  Treaty.	  However,	   this	   issue	   has	  been	  now	  been	   resolved	  by	   the	  CJEU	   in	   a	  manner	   that	  defines	  member	   states’	  obligations	   in	   broad	   terms.	  67	  Under	   the	   approach	   adopted	   by	   the	   Court,	   it	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998,	  s.6(1),	  1(1)(b).	  Legislation	  made	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  or	  the	  Northern	  Irish	  or	  Welsh	  Assemblies	  can	  also	  be	  challenged	  for	  incompatibility	  with	  A1P1.	  See	  Scotland	  Act	  1998,	  s	  29(2)(d);	  Northern	  Ireland	  Act	  1998,	  s	  6(2)(c);	  Government	  of	  Wales	  Act	  2006,	  s	  81.	  For	  previous	  challenges	  to	  tobacco	  control	  legislation	  on	  this	  basis	  under	  the	  Scotland	  Act,	  see	  Sinclair	  
Collis	  Ltd	  v	  Lord	  Advocate	  [2012]	  CSIH	  80,	  [2013]	  SC	  221	  (Court	  of	  Session,	  Inner	  House).	  63	  Such	  a	  challenge	  would	  already	  appear	  to	  be	  underway.	  See	  C	  Cooper,	  “Tobacco	  Companies	  File	  Lawsuits	  against	  UK	  Government	  over	  Plain	  Packaging	  Laws”,	  The	  Independent,	  22nd	  May	  2015.	  In	  considering	  the	  claim	  for	  judicial	  review,	  a	  court	  will	  be	  required	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (HRA	  1998,	  s	  2(1)(a)).	  For	  consideration	  of	  the	  obligation	  of	  UK	  courts	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court,	  see	  3	  below.	  64	  Treaty	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  Art	  6(1).	   65	  Legislation	  which	  cannot	  be	  interpreted	  compatibly	  is	  invalid.	  See	  (C-­‐236/09)	  
Association	  belge	  des	  Consommateurs	  Test-­‐Achats	  ASBL	  [2011]	  ECR	  I-­‐773;	  (C-­‐92/09	  &	  93/09)	  Volker	  und	  Markus	  Schecke	  GbR,	  9	  November	  2010;	  (C-­‐293/12)	  
Digital	  Rights	  Ireland	  Ltd	  v	  Minister	  for	  Communications,	  Marine	  &	  Natural	  
Resources,	  8	  April	  2014. 66	  EU	  Charter,	  Art	  51(1).	  67	  While	  Art	  51(1)	  states	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Charter	  are	  addressed	  to	  member	  states	  only	  when	  they	  are	  “implementing	  Union	  law”,	  this	  restriction	  has	  been	  held	  not	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  position	  adopted	  by	  the	  CJEU	  before	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  (ie,	  that	  members	  states	  are	  obliged	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  EU	  fundamental	  rights	  both	  when	  implementing	  EU	  obligations	  and	  when	  acting	  within	  a	  derogation	  from	  such	  obligations.	  See	  (C-­‐617/10)	  Åklagaren	  v	  Hans	  Åkerberg	  Fransson	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  46	  (CJEU,	  Gd	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highly	   likely	   that	   the	   United	   Kingdom’s	   decision	   to	   introduce	   standardised	  packaging	   legislation	   will	   be	   regarded	   as	   falling	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   EU	   law.	  While	   the	   Regulations	   do	   not	   implement	   EU	   secondary	   legislation,	   they	   fall	  within	   a	  discretion	   explicitly	  provided	   for	  under	   the	   revised	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive. 68 	  Furthermore,	   when	   the	   Regulations	   come	   into	   force,	   they	   will	  undoubtedly	   affect	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods	   within	   the	   European	   Union	  because	   tobacco	   products	   packaged	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   laws	   of	   other	  member	  states	  will	  not	  be	  marketable	   in	   the	  United	  Kingdom.	  Accordingly,	   the	  Regulations	   will	   be	   covered	   by	   Art	   34,	   TFEU,	   which	   prohibits	   all	   quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  and	  all	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect,	  and	  will	  have	  to	   be	   justified	   under	   Art	   36,	   TFEU.69	  In	   derogating	   from	   the	   principle	   of	   free	  movement	   of	   goods	   (on	   the	   ground	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   health	   and	   life),	   the	  United	   Kingdom	   will	   be	   regarded	   as	   acting	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   EU	   law.	  Consequently,	   it	  must	  ensure	  that	  EU	  fundamental	  rights,	   including	  the	  right	  to	  property,	   are	   protected.70	  Within	   this	   framework,	   the	   Industry’s	   claim	   that	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  had	   breached	  Art	   17	  must	   be	   brought	   in	   the	   domestic	   courts	  through	   an	   application	   for	   judicial	   review. 71 	  If	   the	   claim	   is	   upheld,	   the	  Regulations	  will	  be	  struck	  down.72	  	  	  
3 The	   fundamental	   right	   of	   (intellectual)	   property	   in	   the	   European	  
legal	  order	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Chamber);	  (C-­‐390/12)	  Proceedings	  brought	  by	  Pfleger	  [2014]	  3	  CMLR	  47;	  cf	  (C-­‐106/13)	  Fierro	  &	  Marmorale	  v	  Ronchi,	  30	  May	  2013;	  (C-­‐14/13)	  Cholakova,	  6	  June	  2013.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  D	  Sarmiento,	  “Who’s	  Afraid	  of	  the	  Charter?”	  (2013)	  50	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Rev	  1267;	  B	  van	  Bockel	  &	  P	  Wattel,	  “New	  Wine	  into	  Old	  Wineskins;	  the	  Scope	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  EU	  after	  
Åklagaren	  v	  Fransson”	  (2013)	  38	  European	  Law	  Rev	  866;	  J	  Snell,	  “Fundamental	  Rights	  Review	  of	  National	  Measures:	  nothing	  New	  under	  the	  Charter?”	  [2015]	  European	  Public	  Law	  285. 68	  See	  Directive	  2014/40/EU	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  the	  approximation	  of	  the	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  administrative	  provisions	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  concerning	  the	  manufacture,	  presentation	  and	  sale	  of	  tobacco	  and	  related	  products	  and	  repealing	  Directive	  2001/37/EC,	  Recital	  53.	  See	  (C-­‐411/10)	  NS	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  [2012]	  2	  CMLR	  9	  [64]-­‐[69].	  See	  also	  F	  De	  Cecco,	  “Room	  to	  Move?	  Minimum	  Harmonization	  and	  Fundamental	  Rights”	  (2006)	  43	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Rev	  9.	  69	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  application	  of	  Arts	  34	  and	  36	  in	  cases	  concerning	  the	  advertisement	  and	  sale	  of	  tobacco	  products,	  see	  A	  Alemanno,	  “Out	  of	  Sight,	  Out	  of	  Mind	  –	  Towards	  a	  New	  EU	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive”	  (2012)	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  European	  Law	  197.	  	  70	  See	  (C-­‐390/12)	  Proceedings	  brought	  by	  Pfleger	  [2014]	  3	  CMLR	  47.	  71	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  this	  step	  has	  already	  been	  taken.	  See	  C	  Cooper,	  “Tobacco	  Companies	  File	  Lawsuits	  against	  UK	  Government	  over	  Plain	  Packaging	  Laws”,	  
The	  Independent,	  22nd	  May	  2015.	  72	  See	  (C-­‐617/10)	  Åklagaren	  v	  Hans	  Åkerberg	  Fransson	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  46	  (CJEU,	  Gd	  Chamber).	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In	  order	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  Regulations	  violate	  the	  right	  of	  property	  under	  A1P1	  or	  Art	  17,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  understand	  the	  scope	  of	   that	  right	   in	  greater	  detail.73	  A1P1	  provides	  that:	  	   “Every	  natural	  or	  legal	  person	  is	  entitled	  to	  the	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  his	  possessions.	   No	   one	   shall	   be	   deprived	   of	   his	   possessions	   except	   in	   the	  public	   interest	  and	  subject	   to	   the	  conditions	  provided	  for	  by	   law	  and	  by	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  international	  law.	  	  The	  preceding	  provisions	  shall	  not,	  however,	  in	  any	  way	  impair	  the	  right	  of	  a	  State	  to	  enforce	  such	  laws	  as	  it	  deems	  necessary	  to	  control	  the	  use	  of	  property	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  general	  interest	  or	  to	  secure	  the	  payment	  of	  taxes	  or	  other	  contributions	  or	  penalties.”74	  	  	  The	  ECtHR	  has	  developed	  a	  substantial	  jurisprudence	  on	  this	  provision.75	  It	  has	  defined	   the	   protected	   form	   (“possessions”)	   as	   extending	   not	   only	   to	   assets	  recognised	   as	   property	   at	   national	   level,	   but	   also	   as	   covering	   certain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  In	  some	  member	  states,	  the	  question	  would	  also	  arise	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  right	  to	  property	  in	  a	  national	  constitution.	  This	  issue	  has	  been	  raised	  in	  Ireland.	  See	  Law	  Society	  of	  Ireland,	  Opening	  Remarks	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Ireland,	  Mr	  John	  P	  Shaw,	  to	  the	  Joint	  Oireachtas	  Committee	  on	  Health	  &	  Children,	  13th	  February	  2014,	  3-­‐4.	  In	  areas	  which	  are	  completely	  regulated	  by	  EU	  law,	  member	  states	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  grant	  more	  extensive	  protection	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  than	  is	  provided	  under	  EU	  law	  (see	  (C-­‐399/11	  Melloni	  v	  Ministerio	  Fiscal	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  43	  [55]-­‐[64];	  Opinion	  2/13	  of	  the	  Court	  (re	  Accession	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  
on	  Human	  Rights	  [2015]	  2	  CMLR	  21	  [187]-­‐[188]).	  However,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  would	  be	  regarded	  as	  falling	  within	  an	  area	  of	  law	  completely	  regulated	  at	  EU	  level.	  For	  an	  argument	  that	  plain	  packaging	  legislation	  violates	  the	  right	  of	  property	  in	  South	  African	  law,	  see	  OH	  Dean,	  “Trademarks	  &	  Human	  Rights	  –	  the	  Issue	  of	  Plain	  Packaging”	  in	  P	  Torremans	  (ed)	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law	  &	  Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2015)	  571.	  In	  terms	  that	  might	  politely	  be	  described	  as	  trenchant,	  Dean	  argues	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  plain	  packaging	  legislation	  in	  South	  Africa	  would	  constitute	  an	  “arbitrary	  deprivation”	  of	  the	  Industry’s	  property	  and	  thus	  violate	  section	  25(1)	  of	  the	  South	  African	  constitution	  (“…[T]he	  rationale	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  by	  prohibiting	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  DUNHILL	  in	  a	  fancy	  form,	  and	  making	  it	  necessary	  for	  it	  only	  to	  be	  used	  in	  plain	  print	  on	  a	  cigarette	  pack,	  smoking	  cigarettes	  will	  be	  made	  a	  less	  attractive	  proposition.	  Such	  a	  proposition	  is	  patently	  nonsensical.”	  (597).	  74	  For	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  scope	  and	  interpretation	  of	  A1P1,	  see	  AR	  Çoban,	  
Protection	  of	  Property	  Rights	  Within	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  2004);	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  862-­‐905.	  75	  The	  ECtHR	  is	  not	  formally	  bound	  to	  follow	  its	  previous	  judgments.	  However,	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  legal	  certainty,	  it	  will	  not	  easily	  depart	  from	  them.	  See	  Hermann	  v	  
Germany	  (2013)	  56	  EHRR	  7	  [78].	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expectations	  of	  benefit76	  and	  other	  interests	  that	  are	  “sufficiently	  established	  or	  weighty”	   in	   national	   law.77	  It	   has	   confirmed	   that	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	  including	  many	  of	   the	  rights	  relied	  on	  by	  the	  Industry,	  constitute	  “possessions”	  in	  this	  context.78	  The	  only	  relevant	  form	  of	  property	  over	  which	  any	  doubt	  hangs	  is	   the	   “goodwill”	   in	   trading	   signs	   protected	   in	   the	   law	   of	   passing	   off.	   While	  existing	  business	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  recognized	  “possession”	  under	  the	  Strasbourg	  case-­‐law,	   the	   Court	   has	   been	   hesitant	   to	   accept	   that	   “future	   trade”	   can	   be	  protected	  under	  the	  right	  of	  property.79	  	  	  A1P1	  has	  been	  interpreted	  as	  encompassing	  three	  linked	  rights	  (i)	  a	  right	  against	  deprivation	  of	  possessions,	  (ii)	  a	  right	  against	  the	  control	  of	  the	  use	  of	  property	  and	  (iii)	  a	  more	  general	  right	   to	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions.80	  	  Where	  a	  complainant	   suffers	  deprivation	   of	  possessions,	   compensation	  will	   generally	  be	  required.81	  	   In	   certain	   circumstances,	   A1P1	   has	   even	   been	   held	   to	   impose	   a	  
positive	   obligation	   on	   contracting	   parties	   to	   ensure	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   the	  protected	  right	  (or	  to	  remedy	  its	  violation).82	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  A1P1	  grants	  a	  right	  to	  the	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  existing	  possessions	  within	  a	  national	  legal	   system,	   rather	   than	   a	   “right	   to	   property”	   (ie.	   a	   right	   to	   be	   put	   into	   the	  position	  of	  property	  owner).83	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  any	  claim	  that	  the	  Regulations	  violate	  A1P1	  must	  be	  brought	  initially	  in	  the	  domestic	  courts	  under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act.	  Under	  s	  2	  of	  that	  Act,	  any	  Court	  considering	  such	  a	  challenge	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  See,	  for	  example,	  Gratzinger	  v	  Czech	  Republic	  39794/	  98	  (2002)	  35	  EHRR	  CD202	  [68]-­‐[77];	  Klein	  v	  Austria	  57028/00	  [2014]	  59	  EHRR	  14	  [42]-­‐[47].	  77	  Depalle	  v	  France	  [2012]	  54	  EHRR	  17	  [62]-­‐[68];	  Brosset-­‐Triboulet	  v	  France	  34078/02	  [65]-­‐[71];	  Fabris	  v	  France	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  19	  [48]-­‐[50];	  Öneryildiz	  v	  
Turkey	  (2004)	  41	  EHRR	  325	  [124]-­‐[129];	  Anheuser-­‐Busch	  Inc	  v	  Portugal	  (2007)	  45	  EHRR	  830	  	  [62]-­‐[72].	  78	  See,	  for	  example,	  Anheuser-­‐Busch	  Inc	  v	  Portugal	  73049/01,	  (2007)	  45	  EHRR	  830	  (trade	  marks);	  Ashby	  Donald	  v	  France	  (36769/08)	  (copyright);	  Neij	  v	  Sweden	  40397/12,	  [2013]	  ECDR	  7	  (copyright);	  Smith	  Kline	  &	  French	  Laboratories	  Ltd	  v	  
the	  Netherlands	  12633/87,	  (1990)	  66	  DR	  70	  (patents).	  79	  See	  Ian	  Edgar	  (Liverpool)	  Ltd	  v	  UK	  37683/97,	  25th	  January	  2000;	  Malik	  v	  UK	  23780/08,	  13	  March	  2012	  [90]-­‐[93];	  cf	  Van	  Marle	  v	  The	  Netherlands	  8543/79,	  8674/79,	  8675/79,	  8685/79	  [39]-­‐[42].	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  relevant	  authorities,	  see	  R	  (on	  the	  Application	  of	  the	  Countryside	  Alliance)	  v	  AG	  (2007)	  UKHL	  52;	  Breyer	  Group	  plc	  v	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  [2015]	  EWCA	  Civ	  408	  [28]-­‐[49].	  80	  See,	  for	  example,	  James	  v	  UK	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [37];	  Anheuser-­‐Busch	  Inc	  v	  
Portugal	  73049/01,	  (2007)	  45	  EHRR	  830	  [62].	  	  81	  See,	  for	  example,	  Lithgow	  v	  UK	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  329	  [120];	  Holy	  Monasteries	  v	  
Greece	  (1995)	  20	  EHRR	  1	  [71].	  82	  See,	  for	  example,	  Öneryildiz	  v	  Turkey	  48939/99,	  [2004]	  EHRR	  325;	  
Immobiliare	  Saffi	  v	  Italy	  [2000]	  EHRR	  756;	  Budayeva	  v	  Russia	  15339/02,	  [2014]	  EHRR	  2.	  83	  See,	  for	  example,	  Marckx	  v	  Belgium	  6833/74;	  (1979)	  2	  EHRR	  33;	  Fabris	  v	  
France	  (2013)	  16574/08,	  57	  EHRR	  19	  [50].	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“take	  into	  account”	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECtHR.	  On	  this	  wording,	  it	  would	  appear	  possible	  for	  the	  domestic	  court	  either	  (i)	  to	  refuse	  to	  hold	  that	  a	  particular	  act	  has	  violated	  the	  rights	  protected	  under	  the	  ECHR,	  even	  though	  the	  Strasbourg	  jurisprudence	  indicates	  a	  violation	  or	  (ii)	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  Strasbourg	  jurisprudence	  in	  finding	  a	  violation	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  that	  jurisprudence	  indicates	  that	  the	  Convention	  is	  satisfied.	  The	  latter	  possibility	  has	  potential	  relevance	  here.	  As	  will	  be	  indicated	  in	  greater	  detail	  below,	  there	  is	  little	  likelihood	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  would	  hold	  the	  Regulations	  to	  infringe	  the	  right	  protected	  under	  A1P1.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  text	  of	  s	  2	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  appears	  to	  allow	  the	  Industry	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  right	  of	  property	  should	  be	  interpreted	  more	  expansively	  than	  has	  hitherto	  been	  the	  case	  at	  Strasbourg.	  However,	  the	  case-­‐law	  on	  s	  2	  indicates	  that	  such	  a	  claim	  is	  unlikely	  to	  succeed.	  In	  Ullah,	  in	  a	  much-­‐cited	  passage,	  Lord	  Bingham	  stated	  that:	  	   “It	  is	  of	  course	  open	  to	  member	  states	  to	  provide	  for	  rights	  more	  generous	  than	  those	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  Convention,	  but	  such	  provision	  should	  not	  be	  the	  product	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Convention	  by	  national	  courts,	  since	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Convention	  should	  be	  uniform	  throughout	  the	  states	  party	  to	  it.	  The	  duty	  of	  national	  courts	  is	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  Strasbourg	  jurisprudence	  as	  it	  evolves	  over	  time:	  no	  more,	  but	  certainly	  no	  less.”84	  	  More	  recently,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  willingness	   to	  relax	   this	  “mirror	  principle”	   in	  situations	   in	  which	  contracting	  states	  are	  granted	  a	  broad	  “margin	   of	   appreciation”.85	  States	   undoubtedly	   enjoy	   such	   a	   broad	   margin	   of	  appreciation	   in	   deciding	   whether	   an	   interference	   with	   property	   rights	   is	  necessary	  or	  not.86	  Nevertheless,	  the	  general	  desirability	  of	  “keeping	  pace”	  with	  the	  ECtHR	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  jurisprudence	  on	  A1P187	  mean	  that	  the	  domestic	  courts	  are	  unlikely	  to	  forge	  ahead	  in	  recognising	  more	  potent	  property	  rights	  in	  this	  instance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   the	   EU,	   protection	   of	   the	   right	   to	   property	   has	   long	   been	   recognised	   as	   a	  general	   principle	   of	   law,88	  by	   reference	   to	   national	   constitutional	   rights	   and	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  R	  (Ullah)	  v	  Special	  Adjudicator	  [2004]	  2	  AC	  323,	  350.	  For	  criticism	  of	  this	  approach,	  see	  Sir	  J	  Laws,	  The	  Common	  Law	  Constitution,	  Hamlyn	  Lectures	  2013	  	  (CUP,	  2014)	  71-­‐86;	  Lord	  Irvine,	  “A	  British	  Interpretation	  of	  Convention	  Rights”	  [2012]	  Public	  Law	  237;	  cf	  P	  Sales	  “Strasbourg	  Jurisprudence	  and	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act:	  a	  Response	  to	  Lord	  Irvine”	  [2012]	  PL	  253.	  85	  See	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Nicklinson)	  v	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  [2014]	  UKSC	  38	  [67]-­‐[76]	  (Lord	  Neuberger),	  [163]	  (per	  Lord	  Mance),	  [299]	  (Lady	  Hale];	  [342]	  (Lord	  Kerr).	  See	  also	  Re	  G	  (Adoption:	  Unmarried	  Couple)	  [2009]	  1	  AC	  173.	  See,	  also,	  Re	  G	  (Adoption:	  Unmarried	  Couple)	  [2009]	  1	  AC	  173.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  N	  Ferreira,	  “The	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  a	  final	  push	  to	  go	  beyond	  Strasbourg”	  [2015]	  Public	  Law	  367.	  86	  See	  6.2	  below.	  87	  Ibid.	  88	  See,	  for	  example,	  (4/73)	  Nold	  KG	  v	  Commission	  [1974]	  ECR	  491	  [12]-­‐[16];	  (41/79,	  121/79	  &	  796/79)	  Testa	  v	  Bundesanstalt	  für	  Arbeit	  [1980]	  ECR	  1979	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A1P1.89	  This	  right	  was	  codified	  under	  Art	  17(1),	  EU	  Charter,	  which	  provides	  that:	  	   	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  own,	  use,	  dispose	  of	  and	  bequeath	  his	  or	  her	  lawfully	   acquired	   possessions.	   No	   one	   may	   be	   deprived	   of	   his	   or	   her	  possessions,	  except	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  and	  in	  the	  cases	  and	  under	  the	  conditions	  provided	  for	  by	  law,	  subject	  to	  fair	  compensation	  being	  paid	  in	  good	  time	  for	  their	  loss.	  The	  use	  of	  property	  may	  be	  regulated	  by	  law	  in	  so	  far	  as	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  general	  interest.”	  	  The	  Court’s	   early	   case	   law	  on	   the	   right	   of	   property	  was	   relatively	   schematic.90	  However,	   more	   recently,	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	   jurisprudence	  and	  the	  explicit	  wording	  of	  the	  Charter,	  a	  more	  fully	  developed	  set	  of	  principles	  has	   been	   established.91	  	   The	   “possessions”	   protected	   by	   the	   right	   have	   been	  interpreted	   as	   “rights	   with	   an	   asset	   value	   creating	   an	   established	   legal	  position”.92	  Even	   before	   the	   coming	   into	   force	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	   the	   CJEU	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [17]-­‐[22];	  (44/79)	  Hauer	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  [1979]	  ECR	  3727;	  (265/87)	  
Hermann	  Schräder	  HS	  Kraftfutter	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  v	  Hauptzollamt	  Gronau	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237;	  (5/88)	  Wachauf	  v	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  [1989]	  ECR	  2609	  [17]-­‐[18];	  (C-­‐280/93)	  Germany	  v	  Council	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐4973	  [77]-­‐[80];	  (C-­‐293/97)	  R	  v	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Environment	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries	  and	  
Food,	  ex	  parte	  H.A.	  Standley	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2603	  [54]-­‐[58];	  (C-­‐84/95)	  Bosphorus	  
Hava	  Yollari	  ve	  Ticaret	  AS	  v	  Minister	  for	  Transport,	  Energy	  &	  Communications	  1996	  ECR	  I-­‐3953	  [19]-­‐[26];	  (C-­‐20	  &	  64/00)	  Booker	  Aquaculture	  Ltd	  v	  The	  
Scottish	  Ministers,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Mischo	  [60]-­‐[63];	  (C-­‐402/05P,	  415-­‐05P)	  Kadi	  ECR-­‐I	  6351	  [354]-­‐[372].	  For	  discussion	  of	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  within	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  see	  T	  Tridimas,	  The	  General	  Principles	  of	  EU	  Law,	  2nd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2006)(3rd	  ed	  forthcoming,	  2015).	  89	  See,	  for	  example,	  (44/79)	  Hauer	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  [1979]	  ECR	  3727,	  3738-­‐9;	  (265/87)	  Hermann	  Schräder	  HS	  Kraftfutter	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  v	  
Hauptzollamt	  Gronau	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237	  [14];	  Case	  5/88	  Wachauf	  v	  Federal	  
Republic	  of	  Germany	  [1989]	  ECR	  2609	  [17];	  (C-­‐293/97)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
the	  Environment	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries	  and	  Food,	  ex	  parte	  HA	  
Standley	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2603	  [54]-­‐[58].	  90	  See,	  for	  example,	  (4/73)	  Nold	  [1974]	  ECR	  491	  [12]-­‐[16];	  (41/79,	  121/79	  &	  796/79)	  Testa	  v	  Bundesanstalt	  für	  Arbeit	  [1980]	  ECR	  1979	  [17]-­‐[22];	  (265/87)	  
Hermann	  Schräder	  HS	  Kraftfutter	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  v	  Hauptzollamt	  Gronau	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237	  [13]-­‐[19];	  Case	  5/88	  Wachauf	  v	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  [1989]	  ECR	  2609	  [17]-­‐[18].	  91	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐402/05P,	  415-­‐05P)	  Kadi	  ECR-­‐I	  6351	  [354]-­‐[372];	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [31]-­‐[40].	  It	  can,	  however,	  be	  suggested,	  that	  the	  CJEU’s	  approach	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  still	  lacks	  rigour	  in	  some	  instances.	  See	  A	  Peukert,	  “The	  Fundamental	  Right	  to	  (Intellectual)	  Property	  and	  the	  Discretion	  of	  the	  Legislature”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed),	  
Research	  Handbook	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (E	  Elgar,	  2015);	  J	  Griffiths,	  “Constitutionalising	  or	  Harmonising?	  The	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  the	  Right	  to	  Property	  &	  EU	  Copyright	  Law	  (2013)	  European	  Law	  Review	  65.	  	  92	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [34].	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recognised	  that	  the	  right	  of	  property	  covered	  intellectual	  property	  rights.93	  This	  is	  now	  acknowledged	  explicitly	  in	  Art	  17(2)	  of	  the	  Charter,	  which	  states	  that:	  	  	   “Intellectual	  property	  shall	  be	  protected”94	   	  	  This	  provision	  has	  been	  interpreted	  by	  the	  CJEU	  as	  confirmation	  that	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  general	  guarantee	  of	  property	  set	  out	  under	  Art	   17(1)	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   grant	   of	   a	   broader	   form	   of	   absolute	   protection	  specifically	  for	  intellectual	  property.95	  	  There	  are	  distinctions	  between	  the	  texts	  of	  A1P1	  and	  Art	  17.	  The	  drafting	  of	  Art	  17	   takes	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court’s	   interpretation	   of	   A1P1	   into	   account.	   Thus,	   for	  example,	   the	   presumed	   right	   to	   compensation	   for	   deprivation	   of	   property	  developed	  in	   jurisprudence	  under	  the	  ECHR96	  is	  recognised	  explicitly	   in	  Art	  17.	  There	   are	   also	   terminological	   variations	   between	   the	   two	   provisions.	  Interferences	   with	   property	   falling	   short	   of	   full	   deprivation	   are	   described	   as	  “controls”	  in	  A1P1	  and	  as	  “regulations”	  in	  Art	  17.	  Furthermore,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  references	  to	  public,	  or	  general,	  interest	  justifications	  for	  limitations	  on	  the	  right	  of	  property	  shared	  with	  A1P1,	  Art	  17	   is	  also	  subject	   to	  Art	  52(1),	   the	  Charter’s	  general	  provision	  on	  limitations	  to	  protected	  rights.97	  	  However,	  such	  differences	  of	  detail	  between	  A1P1	  and	  Art	  17	  are	  not	  nearly	  as	  significant	  as	  their	  shared	  features.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  given	  the	  textual	  and	  structural	  links	  between	  the	  two	  provisions.	  While	  it	  now	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐479/04)	  Laserdisken	  ApS	  v	  Kulturministeriet	  [2006]	  ECR	  I-­‐8089	  [62];	  (C-­‐275/06)	  Promusicae	  v	  Telefonica	  de	  España	  [2008]	  ECR-­‐I	  211	  [62].	  Like	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court,	  the	  CJEU	  has	  been	  reluctant	  to	  grant	  protection	  to	  future	  trade.	  See	  (C-­‐155/04)	  Alliance	  for	  Natural	  Health	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐6451	  [122]-­‐[130];	  (C-­‐210/03)	  Swedish	  Match	  AB	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11893	  [73]	  (no	  property	  in	  a	  market	  share).	  94	  “Protection	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  right	  of	  property,	  is	  explicitly	  mentioned	  in	  paragraph	  2	  because	  of	  its	  growing	  importance	  and	  Community	  secondary	  legislation.	  Intellectual	  property	  covers	  not	  only	  literary	  and	  artistic	  property	  but	  also	  inter	  alia	  patent	  and	  trademark	  rights	  and	  associated	  rights.	  The	  guarantees	  laid	  down	  in	  paragraph	  1	  shall	  apply	  as	  appropriate	  to	  intellectual	  property.”	  (Explanations	  Relating	  to	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  (2007/C	  303/02)).	  For	  discussion	  of	  Art	  17(2),	  see	  P	  Torremans,	  “Article	  17(2)”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  
Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  489-­‐517;	  C	  Geiger,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Shall	  be	  Protected!?	  Article	  17(2)	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union:	  a	  Mysterious	  Provision	  with	  an	  Uncertain	  Scope”	  [2009]	  EIPR	  13;	  J	  Griffiths	  &	  L	  McDonagh,	  “Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  European	  IP	  Law:	  the	  Case	  of	  Art	  17(2)	  of	  the	  EU	  Charter”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed)	  Constructing	  European	  Intellectual	  
Property:	  Achievements	  and	  Perspectives	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2013).	  95	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐70/10)	  Scarlet	  Extended	  v	  SABAM	  ECR	  I-­‐11959	  [43];	  (C-­‐314/12)	  UPC	  Telekabel	  v	  Constantin	  Film	  Verleih	  GmbH	  [2014]	  ECDR	  12	  [61].	  96	  See	  6.1	  below.	  97	  For	  further	  discussion,	  see	  6.2	  below.	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EU	   will	   adhere	   to	   the	   ECHR	   in	   the	   near	   future,98 	  there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  mechanisms	  within	  EU	   law	  designed,	  so	   far	  as	  possible,	   to	  ensure	  the	  coherent	  development	  of	  European	  fundamental	  rights	   law.	  Thus,	   for	  example,	  Art	  52(3)	  of	  the	  Charter	  provides	  that:	  	   “In	   so	   far	   as	   this	   Charter	   contains	   rights	   which	   correspond	   to	   rights	  guaranteed	   by	   the	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	  Fundamental	   Freedoms,	   the	  meaning	   and	   scope	   of	   those	   rights	   shall	   be	  the	  same	  as	  those	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  said	  Convention.	  This	  provision	  shall	  not	  prevent	  Union	  law	  providing	  more	  extensive	  protection”99	  	  The	   Explanatory	   Note	   to	   this	   provision	   confirms	   that	   Art	   17	   “corresponds	   to”	  A1P1	  and	  states	  that:	  	   “The	  reference	  to	  the	  ECHR	  covers	  both	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  Protocols	  to	  it.	  The	  meaning	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  guaranteed	  rights	  are	  determined	  not	  only	  by	  the	  text	  of	  those	  instruments,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  case-­‐law	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  and	  by	  the	  CJEU.”100	  	  Thus,	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   right	   of	   property	   is	   highly	  relevant	  to	  the	  scope	  and	  requirements	  of	  Art	  17.	  The	  Explanatory	  Note	  to	  Art	  17	  emphasises	  that,	  while	  the	  wording	  of	  A1P1	  has	  been	  “updated:”	  	   “…the	  meaning	  and	  scope	  of	   the	  right	  are	   the	  same	  as	   those	  of	   the	  right	  guaranteed	   by	   the	   ECHR	   and	   the	   limitations	   may	   not	   exceed	   those	  provided	  for	  there.”101	  	  The	   CJEU	   regularly	  makes	   explicit	   reference	   to	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	  Court	  in	  interpreting	  Art	  17102	  and,	  while	  the	  Charter	  clearly	  allows	  the	  Court	  to	  develop	  a	  broader	   conception	  of	   the	   right	   of	  property	  under	  Art	  17,	   it	   has	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Following	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  Art	  6(2)	  TEU	  provides	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  to	  accede	  to	  the	  ECHR.	  However,	  on	  18th	  December	  2014,	  the	  CJEU	  held	  that	  the	  draft	  accession	  agreement	  was	  incompatible	  with	  EU	  law	  (Opinion	  
2/13).	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  EU’s	  accession	  to	  the	  ECHR	  (prior	  to	  Opinion	  2/13),	  see	  P	  Gragl,	  The	  Accession	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  the	  
European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2013).	  99	  For	  full	  discussion	  of	  Art	  52(3),	  see	  S	  Peers	  and	  S	  Prechal,	  “Article	  52”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2014)	  1455-­‐1521.	  	  100	  Explanations	  Relating	  to	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  (2007/C	  303/02).	  101	  Ibid.	  The	  Explanatory	  Note	  to	  Art	  52	  provides	  that:	  “The	  explanations	  drawn	  up	  as	  a	  way	  of	  providing	  guidance	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  this	  Charter	  shall	  be	  given	  due	  regard	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  the	  Union	  and	  of	  the	  Member	  States.”	  102	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐402/05P,	  415-­‐05P)	  Kadi	  ECR-­‐I	  6351	  [354]-­‐[372];	  (C-­‐347/03)	  Regione	  autonoma	  Friuli-­‐Venezia	  Giulia	  [2005]	  ECR-­‐I	  3785	  [118]-­‐[134].	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done	  so	  to	  date.103	  	  	  Against	   this	   background,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   identify	   an	   analytical	   structure	   that	  applies	   to	   both	   A1P1	   and	   Art	   17.	   Within	   this	   structure,	   claims	   must	   be	  approached	   through	   a	   series	   of	   questions:	   First,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   establish	  whether	   the	   rights	   relied	   upon	   by	   a	   claimant	   are	   “possessions”	   covered	   by	  A1P1/Art	  17	  and,	  secondly,	  to	  ask	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  an	  “interference”	  with	  the	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  those	  possessions.	  If	  so,	  an	  attempt	  should	  be	  made	  to	  identify	   the	   form	  of	   the	   interference	   (a	   “deprivation”,	  generally	  giving	  rise	   to	  a	  presumption	   of	   compensation,	   a	   less	   invasive	   “regulation”	   or	   “control”104	  of	  possessions,	   or	   some	   other	   more	   general	   form	   of	   interference)	   Finally,	   a	  decision-­‐maker	   must	   consider	   whether	   the	   interference	   with	   the	   peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions	  is	   justifiable.	  This	  final	  enquiry,	  comprises	  a	  series	  of	  sub-­‐questions.	   Does	   the	   interference	   at	   issue	   satisfy	   the	   condition	   of	   legality?	  Does	  it	  have	  a	  legitimate	  purpose	  in	  the	  general/public	  interest?105	  Finally,	  is	  the	  interference	   proportionate?106	  In	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   article,	   the	   Industry’s	  claim	  that	  the	  Regulations	  violate	  the	  guarantee	  of	  property	  within	  the	  European	  legal	  order	  is	  approached	  through	  this	  sequence	  of	  questions.	  	  	  	  
4 Do	  the	  Regulations	  interfere	  with	  the	  tobacco	  industry’s	  intellectual	  
property	  rights?	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  answer	  the	  first	  question.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Industry’s	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   will	   certainly	   be	   recognised	   as	  “possessions”	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   A1P1	   and	   Art	   17.107	  The	   second	   question	   is	  more	   challenging.	   The	   Regulations	   undoubtedly	   interfere	   with	   the	   Industry’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  EU	  Charter,	  Art	  52(3).	  Although	  there	  are	  distinctions	  between	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  two	  courts	  approach	  the	  justification	  of	  interferences	  with	  the	  right	  of	  property.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  6	  below.	  104	  The	  term	  “control”	  is	  employed	  to	  describe	  an	  interference	  with	  the	  use	  of	  possessions	  falling	  short	  of	  a	  deprivation	  under	  the	  ECHR.	  Under	  the	  Charter,	  this	  concept	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “regulation”.	  In	  this	  article,	  “regulation”	  is	  used	  throughout.	  	  	  105	  Although	  “general	  interest”	  and	  “public	  interest”	  are	  separately	  referred	  to	  in	  both	  A1P1	  and	  Art	  17,	  there	  is	  no	  distinction	  of	  substance	  between	  the	  two	  concepts	  in	  this	  context;	  AR	  Çoban,	  Protection	  of	  Property	  Rights	  within	  the	  
European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  2004);	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  876.	  In	  this	  article,	  the	  term	  “public	  interest”	  is	  employed	  to	  cover	  both	  concepts	  throughout.	  106	  The	  ECtHR’s	  requirement	  that	  a	  “fair	  balance”	  be	  achieved	  between	  recognition	  of	  a	  right	  and	  competing	  interests	  has	  not	  generally	  equated	  to	  a	  strict,	  formal	  test	  of	  proportionality.	  See	  J	  Christoffersen,	  “Human	  Rights	  and	  Balancing:	  the	  Principle	  of	  Proportionality”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed)	  Research	  Handbook	  
on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2015)	  19.	  107	  See	  3,	  above.	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ability	   to	  apply	   its	  brand	  signs	   to	   tobacco	  products.108	  However,	   it	   is	  much	   less	  clear	  that	  they	  interfere	  with	  the	  property	  rights	  themselves.	  There	  are	  at	   least	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  	  	  
4.1	   Intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  negative	  rights	  	  Entitlements	  in	  Intellectual	  property	  law	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  negative	  rights.	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  rights	  to	  prevent	  others	  from	  carrying	  out	  specified	  acts	  rather	  than	  positive	  rights	  of	  use.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  Regulations	  do	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  rights	  at	  issue	  because	  they	  do	  not	  prevent	  right-­‐holders	  from	  bringing	   infringement	   proceedings	   against	   third	   parties.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  Industry	  argues	   that	   intellectual	  property	  rights	  (and,	   in	  particular,	   trade	  mark	  rights)	   are	   not	   purely	   negative,	   but	   necessarily	   and	   implicitly	   encompass	   a	  positive	   right	   of	   use.109	  The	   question	   of	   whether	   or	   not	   intellectual	   property	  rights	  have	  a	  positive	  aspect	  was	  relevant	  to	  the	  constitutional	  claim	  brought	  by	  Japan	  Tobacco	  International	  in	  the	  Australian	  courts110	  and	  is	  also	  a	  critical	  issue	  in	  the	  proceedings	  brought	  against	  Australia	  under	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	  In	  the	  latter	   context,	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   acrimonious	   ink	   has	   been	   spilt	   on	   the	  negative/positive	   question.111	  	   Those	   favouring	   a	   positive	   right	   of	   use	   have	  argued,	  as	  matter	  of	  principle,	  that	  there	  would	  be	  little	  point	  in	  granting	  rights	  in	  a	  registered	  trade	  mark	  if	  the	  proprietor	  were	  not	  also	  provided	  with	  a	  right	  to	   use	   the	  mark.112	  In	   support	   of	   this	   position,	   the	   Industry	   has	   also	   relied	   on	  provisions	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  and	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  which	  are	  said	  to	  provide	  implicit	  authority	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  right.113	  Counter-­‐arguments	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Here,	  “brand	  signs”	  is	  a	  term	  employed	  to	  describe	  the	  full	  range	  of	  the	  Industry’s	  indicia	  affected	  by	  the	  Regulations,	  whether	  protected	  by	  trade	  marks	  (registered	  or	  unregistered),	  designs	  or	  copyright	  works.	  109	  For	  discussion	  of	  this	  issue	  in	  relation	  to	  earlier	  measures	  to	  control	  the	  advertising	  of	  tobacco	  products,	  see	  A	  Kur,	  “The	  Right	  to	  Use	  One’s	  Own	  Trademark:	  a	  Self-­‐Evident	  Issue	  or	  a	  New	  Concept	  in	  German,	  European	  and	  International	  Trade	  Mark	  Law”	  [1996]	  EIPR	  198.	  110	  JT	  International	  SA	  v	  Commonwealth	  [2012]	  HCA	  43;	  (2012)	  291	  ALR	  669.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  S	  Ricketson,	  “Plain	  Packaging	  Legislation	  for	  Tobacco	  Products	  and	  Trade	  Marks	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia”	  (2013)	  3	  Queen	  Mary	  Journal	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  224.	  Under	  Australian	  law,	  by	  contrast	  with	  the	  position	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  statute	  governing	  the	  law	  of	  registered	  trade	  marks	  explicitly	  recognises	  a	  right	  of	  use.	  See	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  1995,	  s	  20(1)(a).	   111	  For	  a	  detailed	  (and	  critical)	  analysis	  of	  the	  arguments	  on	  this	  issue,	  see	  E	  Bonadio,	  “Bans	  and	  Restrictions	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Trade	  Marks	  and	  Consumers’	  Health”	  [2014]	  IPQ	  326.	  	  112	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  Opinion	  of	  Lord	  Hoffmann,	  commissioned	  by	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd;	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Standardised	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  will	  Harm	  Public	  
Health	  and	  Cost	  UK	  Taxpayers	  Billions:	  a	  Response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  
Consultation	  on	  Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  9	  August	  2012,	  Appendix	  5,	  [6].	  113	  See,	  for	  example,	  P	  Johnson,	  “Trade	  Marks	  without	  a	  Brand;	  the	  Proposals	  on	  ‘Plain	  Packaging’	  of	  Tobacco	  Products”	  [2012]	  EIPR	  461;	  D	  Gervais,	  “Analysis	  of	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have	  been	  marshalled.114	  Perhaps	  most	  convincingly,	   it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  right	  to	  use	  would	  involve	  a	  very	  substantial	  transformation	  of	  trade	  mark	  law.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  could	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  grant	  of	  such	  a	  right	  would	  have	  been	  accomplished	  more	  explicitly	  than	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  those	  advocating	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  right.	  	  	  However,	   our	   focus	   here	   is	   on	   European	   fundamental	   rights	   law.	   Would	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (and	  particularly	   trade	  mark	  rights)	  be	  regarded	  as	  giving	   rise	   to	   a	   positive	   right	   of	   use	   within	   this	   body	   of	   law?	   The	   Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  occasionally	  held	  that	   the	  right	   to	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions	  encompasses	   a	   positive	   right	   of	   use	   (or	   access).	   However,	   it	   has	   done	   so	   in	  circumstances	  differing	  very	  significantly	   from	  the	  situation	  with	  which	  we	  are	  concerned	   here.	   The	   successful	   applicants	   in	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   ECtHR	   has	  upheld	   a	   right	   of	   use	   have	   typically	   sought	   access	   to	   domestic	   premises.115	  It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  a	  Court	  considering	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  Regulations	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  draw	  a	  direct	  analogy	  between	  such	  situations	  and	  the	  Industry’s	  claim	  to	  a	   right	   to	  use	   its	  brand	   signs.	   In	  any	  event,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recall	   that	   the	  fundamental	  property	  guarantee	  in	  the	  European	  legal	  order	  is	  a	  secondary	  form	  of	   right.	   A1P1/Art	   17	   protects	   the	   peaceful	   enjoyment	   of	   assets	   established	  within	   national	   legal	   systems.116	  Initial	   responsibility	   for	   “the	   ascription	   and	  identification	   of	   property	   rights	   is	   for	   the	   [national]	   legal	   system”.117	  Thus,	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  Compatibility	  of	  certain	  Tobacco	  Product	  Packaging	  Rules	  with	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  the	  Paris	  Convention,	  Report	  Prepared	  for	  Japan	  Tobacco	  International,	  30	  November	  2010.	  114	  See	  M	  Davison,	  “Plain	  Packaging	  and	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement:	  A	  Response	  to	  Professor	  Gervais”	  [2013]	  Australian	  Intellectual	  Property	  Journal	  160;	  M	  Davison,	  “Plain	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  and	  the	  “Right”	  to	  use	  a	  Trade	  Mark”	  (2012)	  EIPR	  498;	  E	  Bonadio,	  “Bans	  and	  Restrictions	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Trade	  Marks	  and	  Consumers’	  Health”	  [2014]	  IPQ	  326.	  	  115	  See,	  for	  example,	  Loizidou	  v	  Turkey	  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  513	  [60]-­‐[64];	  Doğan	  v	  
Turkey	  (2005)	  41	  EHRR	  15	  [138]-­‐[156].	  116	  See,	  for	  example,	  Depalle	  v	  France	  34044/02	  [2012]	  54	  EHRR	  17	  [68];	  
Brosset-­‐Triboulet	  v	  France	  34078/02	  [71].	  117	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  865.	  Under	  the	  Charter,	  see	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  
Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [34].	  In	  relation	  to	  copyright	  in	  Germany,	  Dreier	  &	  Ganzhorn	  have	  written	  that:	  “…[A]s	  regards	  the	  exceptions	  and	  limitations	  to	  copyright,	  according	  to	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  the	  legislator	  is	  basically	  free	  to	  define	  what	  exactly	  makes	  out	  property.	  True,	  the	  legislature	  cannot	  take	  property	  away	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  cannot	  take	  away	  the	  core	  of	  the	  right.	  But	  at	  the	  outer	  edges	  of	  the	  right,	  the	  legislator	  is	  relatively	  free	  to	  make	  a	  political	  choice	  as	  to	  which	  acts	  should	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  exclusivity	  of	  copyright	  and	  which	  not.”	  (T	  Dreier	  &	  M	  Ganzhorn,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  in	  Decisions	  of	  National	  Constitutional	  Courts	  in	  Europe”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed)	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  Human	  Rights	  &	  Intellectual	  Property	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2015)	  219,	  230).	  See,	  also	  A	  Peukert,	  ”The	  Fundamental	  Right	  to	  (Intellectual)	  Property	  and	  the	  Discretion	  of	  the	  Legislature”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed),	  ibid,	  132.	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considering	  whether	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  positive,	  as	  well	  as	  negative,	  rights,	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   defers	   to	   national	   law.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  arbitrariness,	  a	  domestic	  court’s	  view	  will	  be	  determinative.	  118	  In	  the	  EU,	   the	   position	   is	   different.	   The	   CJEU	   has	   ultimate	   authority	   both	   for	   the	  interpretation	   of	   European	   trade	   mark	   law	   and	   for	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  scope	  of	  Art	  17.	  However,	  even	  in	  this	  context,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  intellectual	  property	  right	  encompasses	  a	  positive	  right	  of	  use	  is	  not	  a	  question	  that	   falls	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   law.119	  In	   the	   case	   of	   trade	  marks,	   for	  example,	   the	  answer	  should	  depend	  on	   the	  Court’s	   interpretation	  of	  the	   Trade	   Marks	   Directive	   and	   Regulation	   (viewed	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   EU’s	  obligations	  under	  international	  treaties	  such	  as	  TRIPS).	  Art	  17	  ought	  to	  function	  purely	   as	   a	   secondary	   control	   on	   interferences	  with	   the	  peaceful	   enjoyment	  of	  property	  rights	  so	  defined.	  On	  this	  basis,	  it	  is	  therefore	  far	  from	  certain	  that	  the	  Regulations	   will	   be	   regarded	   as	   interfering	   with	   the	   Industry’s	   intellectual	  property	   rights	  because,	   as	  noted	  above,	   the	   arguments	   in	   favour	  of	   a	  positive	  right	  of	  use	  in	  trade	  mark	  law	  are	  heavily	  contested.	  	  	  
4.2	   Regulations	   as	   a	   definition	   of	   scope	   of	   property	   rather	   than	   an	  
interference	  with	  property?	  
	  However,	   even	   if	   a	   positive	   right	   of	   use	   is	   held	   to	   exist	  within	   trade	  mark	   law	  (and/or	   copyright	   and	  design	   law),	   the	  Regulations	  may	   still	   not	   be	   viewed	   as	  
interfering	  with	  that	  right.	  As	  has	  been	  indicated	  above,	  initial	  responsibility	  for	  the	   determination	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   a	   property	   right	   lies	  with	   the	   national	   legal	  system.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  sometimes	  held	  that	  a	  court	  within	  a	  contracting	  party	  has	  not	  violated	  A1P1	  where	  it	  has	  simply	  defined	  or	  clarified	  the	  scope	  of	  an	  intellectual	  property	  right	  in	  national	  law.120	  Clearly,	  there	  is	  an	  important	   distinction	   between	   such	   cases	   and	   the	   situation	   under	   discussion	  here.	  The	  alleged	  interference	  with	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  arising	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	   Regulations	   is	   legislative	   rather	   than	   judicial	   and	   therefore	   cannot	   so	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  case	  in	  which	  a	  national	  court’s	  interpretation	  of	  copyright	  law	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  arbitrary,	  see	  Balan	  v	  Moldova	  [2009]	  ECDR	  6.	  119	  See	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [31]-­‐[40];	  (C-­‐277/10)	  Luksan	  v	  Van	  der	  Let	  [2013]	  ECDR	  5.	  120	  See,	  for	  example,	  Anheuser-­‐Busch	  Inc	  v	  Portugal	  73049/01,	  (2007)	  45	  EHRR	  830	  [81]-­‐[87]	  ;	  Dima	  v	  Romania	  (58472/00)	  admissibility	  decision	  of	  28	  May	  2005;	  cf	  Balan	  v	  Moldova	  (19247/03)	  Judgment	  of	  29	  January	  2008.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  J	  Griffiths	  &	  L	  McDonagh,	  “Fundamental	  Rights	  &	  European	  IP	  Law:	  the	  Case	  of	  Art	  17(2)	  of	  the	  EU	  Charter”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed)	  Constructing	  
European	  Intellectual	  Property:	  Achievements	  and	  Perspectives	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2013)	  75.	  This	  situation	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  EU	  context	  as	  references	  for	  a	  preliminary	  reference	  under	  Art	  267	  will	  not	  generally	  require	  the	  CJEU	  to	  adjudicate	  on	  a	  prior	  judgment	  of	  a	  national	  court.	  However,	  see	  F	  Wollenschläger,	  “Article	  17	  –	  Right	  to	  Property”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  
Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2014)	  465,	  477-­‐8.	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readily	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   definition	   or	   clarification	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   rights	   at	  issue.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  may	  be	  relevant	  parallels	  between	  such	  cases	  and	  the	  Industry’s	  claim	  against	  the	  Regulations	  under	  A1P1	  and	  Art	  17.121	  	  	  In	  R	  v	  Secretary	   for	  State	   for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT,	   the	   Industry	   challenged	   the	   first	  Tobacco	  Products	  Directive.122	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  High	  Court	  referred	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  to	  the	  CJEU	  for	  preliminary	  ruling,123	  including	  one	  that	  concerned	  a	  prohibition	   on	   the	   use	   of	   certain	   signs	   and	   words	   (including	   “Mild”)	   in	   the	  marketing	   of	   tobacco.124	  In	   the	   national	   court,	   tobacco	   companies	   claimed	   that	  this	   provision	   interfered	  with	   their	   fundamental	   right	   to	   intellectual	   property.	  Unsurprisingly,	   on	   the	   preliminary	   reference,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   any	  interference	  arising	  under	  the	  contested	  provision	  was	  proportionate	  to	  the	  aim	  of	   securing	  a	  high	   level	  of	  protection	   for	  human	  health.	  This	   ruling	  was	   in	   line	  with	   the	   Opinion	   of	   Advocate	   General	   Geelhoed.125 	  However,	   the	   Advocate	  General	  had	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  companies’	  challenge	  to	  the	  Directive	  should	  have	  been	  rejected	  on	  more	   fundamental	  grounds,	  arguing	   that	   the	  prohibition	  on	   the	   use	   of	   marks	   such	   as	   “Mild	   Seven”	   should	   not	   even	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	  interference	  with	  intellectual	  property	  rights:	  	   “A	  trademark	  coming	  under	  the	  public-­‐law	  ban	  on	  designations	  in	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  Directive	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  public	  health	  is,	  in	  my	  view,	  invalid	  as	  being	  contrary	  to	  public	  policy.126	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  interference	  with	  a	  property	  right	  where,	  even	  without	  the	  contested	  regulation,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  to	  exercise	  the	  right.	  	  The	   Advocate	   General’s	   reasoning	   cannot	   be	   applied	   directly	   to	   the	   situation	  under	  discussion	  here.	   In	  BAT,	   the	  marks	  at	   issue	  were	  deceptive.	  By	   contrast,	  the	  marks	  (and	  other	  signs)	  affected	  by	  the	  Regulations	  are	  not	  all	  deceptive	  and	  are	   thus	   less	  readily	  characterised	  as	  “contrary	  to	  public	  policy,”127	  particularly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  See	  also	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [31]-­‐[40]	  (no	  interference	  with	  right	  to	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions	  because	  protected	  asset	  circumscribed	  by	  statutory	  public	  interest	  limitation	  at	  point	  of	  acquisition).	  	  122	  Directive	  2001/37/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  5	  June	  2001	  on	  the	  approximation	  of	  the	  laws,	  regulations	  and	  administrative	  provisions	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  concerning	  the	  manufacture,	  presentation	  and	  sale	  of	  tobacco	  products.	  	  123	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453.	  	  124	  “…[T]exts,	  names,	  trade	  marks	  and	  figurative	  or	  other	  signs	  suggesting	  that	  a	  particular	  tobacco	  product	  is	  less	  harmful	  than	  others	  shall	  not	  be	  used	  on	  the	  packaging	  of	  tobacco	  products	  (Art	  7).	  125	  See	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453,	  CJEU	  [147]-­‐[153],	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Geelhoed	  [273].	  126	  Ibid,	  Opinion	  of	  AG	  Geelhoed	  [272].	  127	  Under	  the	  Trade	  Marks	  Act	  1994,	  s	  3(3)(a),	  trade	  marks	  shall	  not	  be	  registered	  if	  they	  are	  contrary	  to	  public	  policy	  or	  to	  accepted	  principles	  of	  morality.	  There	  is	  a	  parallel	  provision	  in	  the	  Community	  Trade	  Mark	  Regulation	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as	   the	   Regulations	   include	   a	   provision	   stating	   that	   nothing	   in,	   or	   done	   in	  accordance	  with,	  the	  Regulations	  “causes	  any	  trade	  mark	  to	  be	  contrary	  to	  public	  policy	   or	   to	   accepted	   principles	   of	   morality”	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   trade	   mark	  registration.128	  In	   this	   narrow	   sense,	   then,	   the	  Advocate	  General’s	   reasoning	   in	  
BAT	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  Regulations.	  	  In	  a	  broader	  sense,	  however,	  his	  understanding	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  inherently	   limited	  by	  public	  policy	  remains	  relevant.	  Generally,	   the	  subsistence	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  does	  not	  preclude	  (or	  in	  any	  way	  affect)	  public	  law	  prohibitions	  on	  the	  use	  of	  marks,	  signs,	  works	  or	  inventions	  protected	  by	  those	  rights.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  while	  the	  dissemination	  and	  display	  of	  indecent	  works	  is	   regulated	   under	   criminal	   and	   administrative	   law,	   such	   works	   are	   generally	  protected	  under	  United	  Kingdom	  copyright	  law.129	  Nevertheless,	  this	  protection	  does	   not	   deter	   legislators	   from	   imposing	   new	   controls	   on	   such	   material.	  Pornographers	   have	   not	   yet	   sought	   to	   rely	   on	   A1P1	   or	   Art	   17	   in	   resisting	  increased	  regulation	  of	  their	  trade.	  Similarly,	  the	  marketing	  of	  pharmaceuticals	  is	  heavily	   regulated.	   Public	   bodies	   are	   empowered	   to	   prohibit	   the	  distribution	  of	  pharmaceutical	  products	  completely	  or	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  being	  sale	  under	  a	  particular	  name.	  In	  fulfilling	  these	  functions,	  they	  do	  not	  take	  account	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  particular	  drug	  is	  protected	  by	  a	  patent	  or	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  name	  has	  been	  registered	   as	   a	   trade	   mark	   -­‐	   even	   where	   a	   decision	   deprives	   the	   rights	   in	  question	  of	  all	  value	  and	  provides	  no	  compensation.	  	  	  A1,	  P1	  and	  Art	  17	  are	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  relevant	   in	  such	  situations.	   In	  part,	  this	   may	   be	   because	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   are	   generally	   assumed	   to	   be	  negative	  rights,	  as	  discussed	  above.	  However,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  because	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  are	  viewed	  as	  limited	  ab	  initio	  by	  a	  state’s	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  a	  protected	  form.	  If	   this	   is	  so,	   there	  are	  clear	  parallels	  with	  the	  situation	  under	   consideration	   here.	   The	  Regulations	   function	   as	   a	   public	   law	   control	   on	  the	   use	   of	   branding.	   As	   such,	   it	   may	   be	   suggested,	   they	   do	   not	   fall	   primarily	  within	   the	  domain	  of	   intellectual	   property	   law	   in	  much	   the	   same	  way	   that	   the	  regulation	  of	  indecency	  does	  not	  fall	  within	  copyright	  law	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  pharmaceutical	   marketing	   does	   not	   fall	   within	   the	   domain	   of	   the	   law	   of	  registered	  trade	  marks	  or	  patents.	  The	  exercise	  of	  such	  powers	  is	  to	  be	  expected,	  regardless	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  regulated	  forms.	  On	  this	  basis,	  even	  if	  registered	  trade	  marks	  are	  held	  to	  entail	  a	  positive	  right	  of	  use,	  all	  rights	  in	  such	  marks	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  implicitly	  curtailed	  by	  public	  law	  powers	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  signs	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Council	  Regulation	  207/2009	  of	  26	  February	  on	  the	  Community	  trade	  mark	  (codified	  version),	  reg	  Art	  7(1)(f).	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  interpretation	  of	  these	  provisions,	  see	  L	  Bently	  &	  B	  Sherman,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,	  4th	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  961-­‐3.	  128	  Reg	  13(2)(a).	  The	  Regulations	  also	  provide	  similarly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  registered	  designs	  (reg	  14(2)).	  129	  See	  N	  Caddick,	  G	  Davies	  &	  G	  Harbottle,	  Copinger	  &	  Skone	  James	  on	  Copyright,	  16th	  ed	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  2013)	  3-­‐305.	  
	   25	  
5. What	  form	  of	  interference	  (if	  any?)	  	  Nevertheless,	  as	  is	  demonstrated	  further	  below,	  neither	  the	  ECtHR	  nor	  the	  CJEU	  has	   been	   keen	   to	   engage	   with	   the	   niceties	   of	   property	   theory;	   preferring,	  wherever	   possible,	   to	   resolve	   claims	   about	   the	   application	   of	   the	   right	   of	  property	   through	   the	   application	   of	   the	   proportionality	   test.	   In	  BAT,	   the	   CJEU	  ultimately	  relied	  on	  proportionality	   in	  upholding	   the	   legality	  of	   the	  prohibition	  on	  the	  use	  of	  certain	  marks	  on	  tobacco	  products.130	  Indeed,	  in	  reasoning	  thus,	  it	  could	   be	   regarded	   as	   having	   implicitly	   treated	   the	   legislative	   restriction	   on	  tobacco	   packaging	   as	   an	   interference	   that	   required	   justification.	   Accordingly,	  despite	  significant	  doubt	  whether	  the	  Regulations	  should	  even	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  interference	   with	   Industry’s	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	  move	   on	   to	   consider	   the	   next	   stages	   of	   the	   analytical	   framework	   applied	   to	  claims	   for	  violation	  of	   the	   right	  of	  property	  within	   the	  European	   legal	  order.	   If	  the	   Regulations	   interfere	  with	   the	   Industry’s	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	  what	  form	  does	  that	  interference	  take?	  	  	  As	  has	  been	  noted	  above,	  the	  European	  property	  guarantee	  encompasses	  three	  linked	   sub-­‐rights	   –	  prohibitions	   against	  deprivation	  of	  possessions,	   against	   the	  regulation	   of	   the	   use	   of	   possessions	   and	   a	   more	   general	   prohibition	   on	  interference	   with	   the	   peaceful	   enjoyment	   of	   possessions.131 	  In	   the	   case	   of	  deprivation	   of	   property,	   compensation	   is	   generally	   required.132 	  This	   is	   not	  necessarily	   so	  where	   an	   interference	   falls	  within	   either	   of	   the	   other	   sub-­‐rules,	  although	  compensation	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  ensuring	  that	  a	  restriction	  satisfies	   the	   test	   of	   proportionality.	   On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   the	   Regulations	   do	   not	  appear	  to	  deprive	  the	  Industry	  of	  its	  intellectual	  property	  rights.	  Restrictions	  are	  imposed	   on	   the	   use	   of	   brand	   signs,	   but	   affected	   right-­‐holders	   retain	   their	  property	   interests.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	   Regulations	  constitute	   an	   effective	   deprivation	   of	   those	   rights.	   In	   a	   commissioned	   Opinion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  See	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453,	  CJEU	  [147]-­‐[153].	  131	  See	  Sporrong	  &	  Lönnroth	  v	  Sweden	  (1982)	  5	  EHRR	  35	  [61],	  James	  v	  United	  
Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [37];	  Lithgow	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  329	  [102].	  For	  examples	  of	  cases	  which	  have	  been	  treated	  as	  falling	  under	  the	  third	  general	  head,	  see	  Loizidou	  v	  Turkey	  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  513	  [63];	  Doğan	  v	  Turkey	  (2005)	  41	  EHRR	  15	  [138].	  132	  See	  James	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [54];	  Kozacioğlu	  v	  Turkey	  (2011)	  53	  EHRR	  34	  [64];	  Vistins	  v	  Latvia	  (2014)	  58	  EHRR	  4	  [110].	  In	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  a	  failure	  to	  pay	  compensation	  for	  the	  deprivation	  of	  property	  may	  not	  violate	  A1P1.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jahn	  v	  Germany	  (2005)	  42	  EHRR	  1084.	  In	  the	  EU	  Charter,	  the	  obligation	  to	  pay	  compensation	  in	  cases	  of	  deprivation	  is	  explicitly	  noted	  in	  Art	  17(1).	  In	  German	  constitutional	  law,	  the	  legislature	  may	  curtail	  an	  intellectual	  property	  right	  entirely	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  compelling	  public	  interest.	  See	  T	  Dreier	  &	  M	  Ganzhorn,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  in	  Decisions	  of	  National	  Constitutional	  Courts	  in	  Europe”	  in	  C	  Geiger	  (ed)	  Research	  Handbook	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  &	  Intellectual	  Property	  (Edward	  Elgar,	  2015)	  219,	  230.	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appended	   to	   Philip	   Morris’s	   submission	   to	   the	   2012	   consultation, 133 	  Lord	  Hoffmann	   suggested	   that	   standardised	  packaging	   legislation	   curtails	   the	  use	  of	  the	  Industry’s	  rights	  so	  extensively	  that	  it	  undermines	  their	  very	  substance	  and	  must,	   therefore,	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   deprivation	   of	   property.	   Furthermore,	   he	  pointed	   out	   that	   each	   of	   the	   Industry’s	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   is	   to	   be	  viewed	  as	  a	  separate	  property	  entitlement.	  As	  such,	  even	  though	  use	  of	  certain	  word	  marks	   remains	   possible	   under	   the	   Regulations,	   the	   Industry	   is	   deprived	  entirely	  of	  its	  ability	  to	  apply	  other	  protected	  signs	  (including	  graphic	  marks	  and	  packaging	  designs)	  to	  its	  products.	  	  At	   first	   sight,	   the	  decision	  of	   the	  Australian	  High	  Court	   in	   JT	  International	  SA	  v	  
Commonwealth	  appears	   to	   offer	   some	   support	   for	   this	   position.134	  In	   that	   case,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  there	  was	  no	  violation	  of	  the	  constitutional	  right	  of	  property	  because	   the	   Commonwealth	   did	   not	   “acquire”	   the	   tobacco	   companies’	  intellectual	   property	   rights.	   Nevertheless,	   some	   of	   the	   judgments	   in	   that	   case	  appear	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  of	  the	  claimant	  companies	  had	  been	   “taken”.135	  However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recall	   that	   the	  Australian	   legal	  context	   is	  different	   from	   that	  with	  which	  we	  are	   concerned	  here.	   In	  particular,	  the	  Australian	   constitutional	   right	   of	   property	   is	   only	   violated	  where	   the	   state	  “acquires”	   property	   without	   adequate	   compensation136	  and,	   as	   a	   result,	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  had	  been	  “taken”	  was	  not	  determinative	  of	  the	  case’s	  outcome.	  	  More	   importantly,	   however,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   features	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	  Court’s	   jurisprudence	   on	  A1P1	   that	   suggest	   very	   strongly	   that	   the	  Regulations	  will	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  depriving	  the	  Industry	  of	  its	  possessions.	  First,	  although	  there	  are	  three	  sub-­‐rules	  under	  A1P1,	  the	  Court	  has	  often	  gone	  out	  of	  its	  way	  to	  avoid	  distinguishing	  clearly	  between	  these	  rules	  in	  practice;	  preferring	  to	  regard	  the	  concepts	  of	  “deprivation”	  and	  “control”	  as	  particular	  reflections	  of	  a	  broader	  right	  to	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions:	  	   “The	  three	  rules	  are	  not	  “distinct”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  unconnected:	  the	  second	   and	   third	   rules	   are	   concerned	   with	   particular	   instances	   of	  interference	  with	  the	  right	  to	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  property	  and	  should	  therefore	  be	  construed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  general	  principle	  enunciated	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  See,	  the	  Opinion	  of	  Lord	  Hoffmann,	  commissioned	  by	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd;	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Standardised	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  will	  Harm	  Public	  Health	  and	  Cost	  UK	  
Taxpayers	  Billions:	  a	  Response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  
Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  9	  August	  2012,	  Appendix	  5	  [9]-­‐[20].	  134	  JT	  International	  SA	  v	  Commonwealth	  [2012]	  HCA	  43;	  (2012)	  291	  ALR	  669. 135	  Ibid,	  [44]	  French	  CJ,	  [137]-­‐[143]	  Hayne	  &	  Bell	  JJ.	  136	  The	  constitutional	  right	  of	  property	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  implicit	  in	  the	  power	  granted	  to	  the	  Commonwealth	  Parliament	  under	  s	  51(xxxi)	  of	  the	  Constitution:	  “The	  Parliament	  shall,	  subject	  to	  this	  Constitution,	  have	  powers	  to	  make	  laws	  for	  the	  peace,	  order	  and	  good	  government	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  with	  respect	  to:	  …..	  (xxxi)	  the	  acquisition	  of	  property	  on	  just	  terms	  from	  any	  State	  or	  person	  for	  any	  purpose	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  the	  Parliament	  has	  powers	  to	  make	  laws”.	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the	  first	  rule.”137	  	  This	  tendency	  to	  soften	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  three	  “rules”	  is	  particularly	  marked	  in	  the	  Court’s	  recent	  jurisprudence.	  138	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  considering	  a	  claim	  against	  a	  contracting	  state	   for	  restitution	  of	  ownership	  of	  a	  dwelling	   in	  
Dokić	  v	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that:	  	   	  “…The	  complexity	  of	   the	   legal	   situation	   in	   the	  present	   case	  prevents	   its	  being	   classified	   in	   a	   precise	   category:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   impugned	  purchase	  contract	  is	  regarded	  as	  legally	  valid	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  applicant	  is	  unable	  to	  have	  his	  flat	  restored	  to	  him	  and	  to	  be	  registered	  as	  its	  owner	  pursuant	   to	   that	   contract.	  While	   this	   situation	   resembles	  a	  de	  facto	   expropriation,	   the	   Court	   does	   not	   consider	   it	   necessary	   to	   rule	   on	  whether	  the	  second	  sentence	  of	  the	  first	  paragraph	  of	  art	  1	  applies	  in	  this	  case…[T]he	   situation	   envisaged	   in	   the	   second	   sentence	   of	   the	   first	  paragraph	  of	   art	   1	   is	   only	   a	   particular	   instance	  of	   interference	  with	   the	  right	  to	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  property	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  general	  rule	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  first	  sentence.	  The	  Court	  therefore	  considers	  that	  it	  should	  examine	  the	  situation	  complained	  of	  in	  the	  light	  of	  that	  general	  rule.139	  	  The	   Court	   has	   also	   often	   held	   very	   serious	   interferences	   with	   the	   peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions	  to	  be	  “controls”	  rather	  than	  “deprivations”.140	  	  A	  further	  reason	  for	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Regulations	  would	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  “deprivation”	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court,	  in	   particular,	   has	   tended	   to	   view	   the	   concept	   of	   “possessions”	   as	   an	  undivided	  whole	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  ”bundle”	  of	  separable	  rights.141	  As	  Çoban	  has	  explained:	  	   “The	  established	   case-­‐law	  suggests	   that	   the	   right	   to	  property	   is	   a	   single	  right	  which	  gives	  different	  use	  rights.	  The	  right	  of	  disposal	  also	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  way	  of	  use.	  Each	  use	  right	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  distinct	  property	  right,	  so	  interference	  with	  such	  use	  does	  not	  constitute	  deprival	  of	  property.	  It	  can	  be	  inferred	  that	  the	  Strasbourg	  jurisprudence	  does	  not	  accept	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  bundle	  of	  rights	  theory	  of	  property.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  James	  v	  UK	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [37].	  See	  also,	  Mellacher	  v	  Austria	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  391	  [42];	  Anheuser-­‐Busch	  Inc	  v	  Portugal	  (2007)	  45	  EHRR	  830	  [62];	  Beyeler	  
v	  Italy	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  52	  [98],	  [106];	  Jokela	  v	  Finland	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  26	  [49];	  
Dokić	  v	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  [2013]	  EHRR	  38	  [56]-­‐[57].	  138	  See	  R	  White	  &	  C	  Ovey,	  Jacobs,	  White	  &	  Ovey:	  The	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	  5th	  ed	  (OUP,	  2010)	  503;	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  
Law	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  876.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Klein	  v	  Austria	  (2014)	  59	  EHRR	  14	  [49].	  	  139	  Dokić	  v	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  [2013]	  EHRR	  38	  [56].	  140	  See,	  for	  example,	  JA	  Pye	  (Oxford)	  Ltd	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  45	  [64]-­‐[66].	  141	  This	  approach	  will	  be	  more	  familiar	  to	  civil,	  than	  common,	  lawyers.	  See	  Y-­‐C	  Chang	  &	  HE	  Smith,	  “An	  Economic	  Analysis	  of	  Civil	  versus	  Common	  Law	  Property”	  (2012)	  88	  Notre	  Dame	  Law	  Review	  1.	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important	   for	   the	   distinction	   between	   deprivation	   of	   property	   and	   the	  control	   on	   use	   of	   property.	   This	   distinction	   is	   a	   key	   element	   for	   the	  jurisprudence	  on	  [A1P1].”142	  	  	  Under	  this	  holistic	  approach,	  a	  deprivation	  of	  possessions	  will	  only	  occur	  where	  
all	  rights	  in	  an	  applicant’s	  possessions	  are	  extinguished.143	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  
OAO	  Neftyanaya	  Kompaniya	  Yukos	   v	  Russia,	   the	   enforcement	   of	   tax	   obligations	  through	   the	   seizure	   and	   sale	   of	   the	   applicant	   company’s	   subsidiary	   companies	  was	   treated,	  without	   discussion,	   as	   a	   regulation	   of	   the	   applicant’s	   possessions	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  deprivation	  of	  the	  subsidiaries	  as	  separate	  possessions.144	  While	  the	   Luxembourg	   Court’s	   jurisprudence	   on	   the	   right	   of	   property	   is	   not	   as	   fully	  developed	  as	  that	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  there	  are	  indications	  that	  it	  will	  also	  be	  reluctant	  to	  regard	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  complete	  transfer	  of	  possessions	  as	  a	  deprivation.145	  	  	  	  
6.	   Justifying	   Interference	   with	   the	   Industry’s	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Rights	  	  On	   this	   basis,	   the	   Regulations	   will	   be	   regarded,	   at	   worst,	   as	   a	   regulation,	   or	  control,	   of	   the	   Industry’s	  use	  of	   its	  possessions.	  Within	   the	  analytical	   structure	  applied	   to	  A1P1	   and	  Art	   17,	   it	   is	   therefore	   necessary	   to	   ask	  next	  whether	   this	  interference	  can	  be	  justified.	  In	  order	  to	  withstand	  scrutiny	  under	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	   Charter,	   the	   Regulations	   must	   surmount	   three	   hurdles.	   They	   must	   (i)	   be	  “provided	   for	  by	   law”;	   (ii)	  pursue	  a	   “legitimate	  aim”	  and	  (iii)	  be	  proportionate.	  While	  serious	  objection	  has	  not	  been	  brought	  against	  the	  Regulations	  on	  either	  of	   the	   first	   two	   grounds,	   a	   number	   of	   the	   Industry’s	   arguments	   address	   the	  question	   of	   proportionality.	   It	   has,	   for	   example,	   been	   suggested	   that	   there	   is	  inadequate	   evidence	   that	   the	   legislation	   will	   achieve	   its	   stated	   goals,	   that	  undesirable	  side-­‐effects	  will	  occur	  and	  that	  compensation	  must	  be	  paid	  if	  a	  “fair	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  AR	  Çoban,	  Protection	  of	  Property	  Rights	  Within	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  2004)	  162.	  See	  also	  176.	  143	  As	  noted	  by	  D	  Harris	  et	  al:	  “If	  ownership	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  bundle	  of	  rights,	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  owner	  has	  been	  deprived	  of	  one	  right	  will	  not	  usually	  be	  sufficient	  to	  say	  that	  he	  has	  been	  deprived	  of	  ownership:	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  control	  of	  the	  use	  of	  property.”	  (Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  
Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  886.	  144	  OAO	  Neftyanaya	  Kompaniya	  Yukos	  v	  Russia	  (2012)	  54	  EHRR	  19	  [646].	  See	  also	  
Mellacher	  v	  Austria	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  391	  [42]-­‐[44];	  Tre	  Traktörer	  Aktiebolag	  v	  
Sweden	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  309;	  Fredin	  v	  Sweden	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  784;	  Pine	  Valley	  
Developments	  v	  Ireland	  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  316	  [55]-­‐[56];	  Chassagnou	  v	  France	  (2000)	  29	  EHRR	  615	  [74];	  Hutten-­‐Czapska	  v	  Poland	  (2007)	  45	  EHRR	  52	  [160]-­‐[161].	  145	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453	  [152].	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balance”	  between	  competing	  interests	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.	  146	  There	  are	  significant	  distinctions	   between	   the	   methodologies	   applied	   by	   the	   Strasbourg	   and	  Luxembourg	  courts	  on	  this	  issue.147	  Accordingly,	  the	  two	  systems	  are	  considered	  in	  separate	  sections	  below.	  	  	  
6.1	   European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  	   Under	  A1P1,	   the	  Regulations	  will	  undoubtedly	  be	  regarded	  as	  “provided	   for	  by	  law”.	  They	   are	   clear	   in	   scope	   and	  detailed	   in	   form.148	  The	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  UK	  legislature’s	   aim	   in	   introducing	   the	   Regulations	   is	   also	   beyond	   question.	   The	  Strasbourg	  Courts	  has	   repeatedly	   stated	   that	   contracting	  parties	  enjoy	  a	  broad	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  determining	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  public	  policy	  goals	  under	   A1P1.149	  The	   national	   authority’s	   assessment	   on	   this	   issue	   will	   only	   be	  questioned	   in	  extreme	  circumstances.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  Regulations,	   the	  public	  policy	  aim	  is	  clear.	  They	  are	  directed	  at	   the	  protection	  of	  public	  health	  (and,	   in	  particular,	  the	  protection	  of	  young	  people’s	  health).	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  question	  of	  proportionality.	  The	  ECtHR	  has	  stated	  that	  the	  “search	   for	   a	   fair	   balance	   between	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   general	   interest	   of	   the	  community	   and	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   individual’s	  fundamental	  rights”	  is	  inherent	  throughout	  the	  Convention.150	  The	  “fair	  balance”	  concept	  has	  played	  a	  particularly	  important	  role	  when	  the	  Court	  has	  considered	  limitations	  to	  the	  rights	  protected	  under	  the	  Convention.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  various	   factors	   have	   been	   considered	   to	   be	   relevant	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	  “fair	   balance”.	   These	   have	   included	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   objective	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  	  See	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  UK	  Ltd,	  Response	  of	  British	  American	  Tobacco	  
UK	  Ltd	  to	  the	  2014	  Consultation	  5-­‐7;	  Imperial	  Tobacco,	  Illegal,	  Unnecessary	  &	  
Damaging	  for	  UK	  plc:	  Why	  Standardised	  Packaging	  is	  a	  Bad	  Policy	  Idea	  that	  would	  
not	  Work,	  7	  August	  2014,	  4-­‐6;	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Response	  to	  the	  Consultation	  on	  
“Standardised	  Packaging”,	  7	  August	  201412-­‐23;	  JTI’s	  Response	  to	  the	  UK	  
Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  the	  Introduction	  of	  Regulation	  on	  the	  
Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  6	  August	  2014,	  2-­‐5.	  147	  See	  See	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Lumsdon)	  v	  Legal	  Services	  Board	  [2015]	  UKSC	  41	  [26].	  148	  For	  application	  of	  the	  “provided	  for	  by	  law”	  condition	  under	  A1P1,	  see	  Vistins	  
v	  Latvia	  (2014)	  58	  EHRR	  4	  (Gd	  Chamber)	  [100],	  [105];	  Khodorkovskiy	  v	  Russia	  (2014)	  59	  EHRR	  7	  [876]-­‐[885];	  NKM	  v	  Hungary	  66529/11,	  14th	  May	  2013.	  For	  discussion,	  see	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  878-­‐880.	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  “provided	  for	  by	  law”	  requirement	  under	  art	  52(1)	  of	  the	  EU	  Charter,	  see	  S	  Peers	  and	  S	  Prechal,	  “Article	  52”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  
Rights:	  a	  Commentary,	  1470-­‐1474.	  149	  Under	  A1P1,	  see	  Vistins	  v	  Latvia	  (2014)	  58	  EHRR	  4	  (Gd	  Chamber)	  [106]-­‐[107];	  Wieczorek	  v	  Poland	  [2013]	  56	  EHRR	  36	  [59].	  See	  also	  Harris	  et	  al,	  ibid,	  876-­‐877;	  AR	  Çoban,	  Protection	  of	  Property	  Rights	  Within	  the	  European	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  2004)	  199-­‐204.	  	  150	  Soering	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1989)	  11	  EHRR	  439	  [89].	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interference	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  protected	  interest,151	  the	  availability	  of	  less	  intrusive	   means	   of	   attaining	   the	   state’s	   objective,152	  the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  measure	   at	   issue,153 	  the	   existence	   of	   procedural	   safeguards,154 	  delay	   in	   the	  implementation	   of	   an	   interference155 	  and	   the	   payment	   of	   compensation.156	  However,	   in	   considering	   proportionality,	   the	   Court	   has	   rarely	   applied	   the	  disciplined	  approach	  characteristic	  of	  other	  European	  legal	  systems,	  such	  as	  for	  example,	   that	   employed	   in	   German	   administrative	   law.157 	  Indeed,	   in	   many	  situations,	   it	  has	  permitted	  member	   states	  a	  broad	   “margin	  of	   appreciation”	   in	  recognition	   that	   there	   may	   be	   a	   broad	   divergence	   of	   cultures	   within	   the	  contracting	  parties	  on	  certain	  issues	  and	  that,	  in	  some	  cases,	  national	  authorities	  are	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  judge	  what	  is	  necessary	  under	  local	  conditions.	  158	  	  In	  considering	  proportionality	  under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act,	  domestic	  courts	  do	  not	   simply	   mirror	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court. 159 	  Influenced	   by	  domestic	   administrative	   law,	   a	   more	   structured	   and	   rigorous	   methodology	   is	  employed.	  This	  was	  recently	  summarised	  by	  Lord	  Reed:	  	   “[I]t	  is	  necessary	  to	  determine	  (1)	  whether	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  measure	  is	  sufficiently	  important	  to	  justify	  the	  limitation	  of	  a	  protected	  right,	  (2)	  whether	  the	  measure	  is	  rationally	  connected	  to	  the	  objective,	  (3)	  whether	  a	  less	  intrusive	  measure	  could	  have	  been	  used	  without	  unacceptably	  compromising	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  objective,	  and	  (4)	  whether,	  balancing	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  measure’s	  effects	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  persons	  to	  whom	  it	  applies	  against	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  objective,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  measure	  will	  contribute	  to	  its	  achievement,	  the	  former	  outweighs	  the	  latter.”160	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Regulations,	   the	   application	   of	   this	   stricter	   general	  proportionality	   standard	  would	   require	   a	   domestic	   court	   to	   consider	   whether	  there	   is	  evidence	   that	   the	  Regulations	  are	   likely	   to	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  smoking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  See	  further	  below.	  152	  See	  Riener	  v	  Bulgaria,	  46343/99,	  23	  May	  2006	  [125]..	  153	  See	  Weber	  v	  Switzerland	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  508;	  Observer	  &	  Guardian	  v	  United	  
Kingdom	  (1991)	  14	  EHRR	  153.	  154	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jokela	  v	  Finland	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  26	  [45]. 155	  See,	  for	  example,	  Moskal	  v	  Poland	  (2010)	  50	  EHRR	  20.	  156	  See	  below.	  157	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  been	  described	  as	  applying	  the	  proportionality/”fair	  balance”	  test	  in	  a	  “relatively	  broad-­‐	  brush	  way”	  (see	  Bank	  
Mellat	  v	  HM	  Treasury	  [2013]	  UKSC	  39;	  [2014]	  AC	  700	  [70]	  (per	  Lord	  Reed).	  	  158	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  “margin	  of	  appreciation”	  concept,	  see	  A	  Legg,	  The	  
Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  in	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  (OUP,	  2012);	  Y	  Arai-­‐Takahashi,	  The	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  Principle	  of	  
Proportionality	  in	  the	  Jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECHR	  (Intersentia,	  2002).	  159	  Bank	  Mellat	  v	  HM	  Treasury	  [2013]	  UKSC	  39;	  [2014]	  AC	  700	  [72]	  (per	  Lord	  Reed).	  	  160	  Ibid,	  [74].	  In	  formulating	  the	  test	  thus,	  he	  drew	  particularly	  on	  the	  judgment	  of	  Dickson	  CJ	  in	  R	  v	  Oakes	  [1986]	  1	  SCR	  103	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada)..	  
	   31	  
amongst	   young	   people,	   whether	   this	   effect	   could	   have	   been	   achieved	   through	  other	   less	   intrusive	   means	   and	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   proportionate	   relationship	  between	   the	   beneficial	   effect	   of	   the	   Regulations	   and	   their	   impact	   on	   the	  Industry’s	   intellectual	  property	   rights.	  This	   is	   a	  more	  exacting	   level	  of	   scrutiny	  	  than	  the	  Regulations	  would	  receive	  at	  Strasbourg.	  However,	  whichever	  of	  these	  two	   approaches	   is	   adopted,	   it	   can	   be	   suggested	   that	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  features	  of	  the	  jurisprudence	  on	  A1P1	  which	  suggest	  that,	  in	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  the	  Regulations,	  the	  test	  of	  proportionality	  would	  be	  passed.	  	  First,	  despite	  the	  apparent	  generality	  of	  the	  form	  of	  analysis	  described	  above,	  the	  standard	  of	   review	  applied	   to	  A1P1	   is	  more	   relaxed	   than	   that	   applied	   to	  other	  rights	  protected	  under	  the	  ECHR.	   In	   its	  early	  case	   law	  on	  the	  right	  of	  property,	  the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   contented	   itself	   with	   considering	   only	   legality	   and	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  contracting	  state’s	  purpose.161	  This	  approach	  was	  tightened	  up	  in	  
Sporrong	   &	   Lönnroth	   v	   Sweden,	   though	   the	   identification	   of	   an	   implicit	  requirement	   for	   a	   “fair	   balance”	   between	   the	   right	   of	   property	   and	   the	   public	  interest.162	  The	   Court	   elaborated	   on	   this	   concept	   in	   James	   v	   United	   Kingdom,	  holding	  that:	  	   “…[T]here	  must…be	  a	  reasonable	  relationship	  of	  proportionality	  between	  the	   means	   employed	   and	   the	   aim	   sought	   to	   be	   realised.	   This	   latter	  requirement	   was	   expressed	   in	   other	   terms	   in	   the	   Sporrong	   and	  
Lônnroth	  judgment	  by	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  'fair	  balance'	  that	  must	  be	  struck	  between	   the	  demands	  of	   the	   general	   interest	   of	   the	   community	   and	   the	  requirements	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  individual's	  fundamental	  rights.	  The	  requisite	   balance	  will	   not	   be	   found	   if	   the	   person	   concerned	   has	   had	   to	  bear	  'an	  individual	  and	  excessive	  burden'.”163	  	  Subsequently,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  “controls”	  on	  the	  peaceful	  enjoyment	  of	  possessions,	  the	  Court	  noted	  that:	  	   “…	   States	   enjoy	   a	   wide	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   with	   regard	   both	   to	  choosing	   the	   means	   of	   enforcement	   and	   to	   ascertaining	   whether	   the	  consequences	  of	  enforcement	  are	   justified	  in	  the	  general	   interest	   for	  the	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  the	  object	  of	  the	  law	  in	  question.”164	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  Y	  Windisdoerffer,	  “Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  and	  Article	  1	  of	  Protocol	  No	  1”	  (1998)	  19(1)	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Journal	  18,	  19.	  See	  Handyside	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1979-­‐80)	  1	  EHRR	  732	  [62];	  Marckx	  v	  Belgium	  (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  330	  [64].	  162	  “…[T]he	  Court	  must	  determine	  whether	  a	  fair	  balance	  was	  struck	  between	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  community	  and	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  individual's	  fundamental	  rights.	  The	  search	  for	  this	  balance	  is	  inherent	  in	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  Article	  1.”	  	  (1983)	  5	  EHRR	  35	  [69]	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  163	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [50]	  (footnotes	  omitted).	  See	  also	  CEM	  Firearms	  Ltd	  v	  
United	  Kingdom,	  37674/97	  &	  37677/97,	  26	  September	  2000	  (admissibility).	  	  164	  JA	  Pye	  (Oxford)	  Ltd	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  45	  [55].	  See	  also	  James	  
v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [50]-­‐[56];	  Tre	  Traktörer	  Aktiebolag	  v	  
Sweden	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  309	  [62];	  Immobiliare	  Saffi	  v	  Italy	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  Thus,	   by	   contrast	   with	   references	   to	   “pressing	   social	   need”	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  Court’s	   jurisprudence,	   the	  standard	  of	   review	  applied	   to	   interferences	  with	   the	  peaceful	   enjoyment	   of	   possessions	   under	   A1P1	   (“reasonable	   relationship	   of	  proportionality”)	   is	   not	   a	   stringent	   one.165	  As	   long	   as	   an	  unfair	   “individual	   and	  excessive	  burden”	  is	  not	   imposed	  upon	  a	  right-­‐holder,166	  the	  Court	  will	  be	  slow	  to	   intervene.	   This	   is	   particularly	   so	   where	   an	   interference	   is	   classified	   as	   a	  control	  on	  the	  use	  of	  property,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  deprivation.167	  	  	  There	  are	  further	  features	  of	  the	  jurisprudence	  on	  A1P1	  which	  make	  it	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Regulations	  will	  be	  held	  to	  violate	  the	  right	  of	  property.	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court	   has	   exercised	   particular	   restraint	   in	   reviewing	   state	   intervention	   on	  matters	  of	  public	  policy.	  In	  considering	  a	  claim	  for	  deprivation	  of	  possessions	  in	  
James	  v	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that:	  	   “…The	   decision	   to	   enact	   laws	   expropriating	   property	   will	   commonly	  involve	   consideration	   of	   political,	   economic	   and	   social	   issues	   on	   which	  opinions	  within	   a	   democratic	   society	  may	   reasonably	   differ	  widely.	   The	  Court,	   finding	   it	  natural	   that	   the	  margin	  of	   appreciation	  available	   to	   the	  legislature	  in	  implementing	  social	  and	  economic	  policies	  should	  be	  a	  wide	  one,	   will	   respect	   the	   legislature's	   judgment	   as	   to	   what	   is	  'in	   the	   public	  interest'	  unless	   that	   judgment	   be	   manifestly	   without	   reasonable	  foundation.”168 
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [49];	  Chassagnou	  v	  France	  (2000)	  29	  EHRR	  615	  [75];	  Zvolský	  and	  Zvolská	  v	  Czech	  
Republic	  46129/99,	  12	  November	  2003	  [69];	  Brosset-­‐Triboulet	  v	  France	  34078/02,	  29	  March	  2010;	  Hermann	  v	  Germany	  (2013)	  56	  EHRR	  7	  [74];	  NKM	  v	  
Hungary	  66529/11,	  14	  May	  2013	  [61].	  For	  discussion,	  see	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  874,	  904;	  AR	  Çoban,	  Protection	  of	  Property	  Rights	  Within	  the	  
European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Ashgate,	  2004)	  206-­‐210;	  D	  Spielmann,	  “Allowing	  the	  Right	  Margin:	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  National	  Margin	  of	  Appreciation	  Doctrine:	  Waiver	  or	  Subsidiarity	  of	  European	  Review”	  [2011]	  Cambridge	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Legal	  Studies	  381.	  165	  The	  relatively	  weak	  form	  of	  protection	  offered	  to	  property	  rights	  has	  also	  been	  recognised	  by	  domestic	  courts.	  See,	  R	  (Alconbury	  Developments	  Ltd)	  v	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Environment,	  Transport	  &	  the	  Regions	  [2001]	  UKHL	  23,	  [2003]	  2	  AC	  295	  [71]-­‐[72]	  (per	  Lord	  Hoffmann);	  Bank	  Mellat	  v	  HM	  Treasury	  [2013]	  UKSC	  39;	  [2014]	  AC	  700	  [128]	  (per	  Lord	  Reed,	  right	  “not	  of	  the	  most	  sensitive	  character”).	  166	  See,	  for	  example,	  Kjartan	  Asmundsson	  v	  Iceland	  	  (2005)	  41	  EHRR	  42. 167	  Gillow	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1985)	  11	  EHRR	  335.	  168	  James	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [46].	  See	  also	  Valkov	  v	  Bulgaria	  2033/04	  and	  others,	  25	  October	  2011	  [92];	  Hatton	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  [2003]	  37	  EHRR	  28	  [97];	  Jahn	  v	  Germany	  (2006)	  42	  EHRR	  49;	  JA	  Pye	  (Oxford)	  Ltd	  v	  United	  
Kingdom	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  45	  [71].	  See	  also	  Wilson	  v	  First	  County	  Trust	  Ltd	  [2003]	  UKHL	  40	  [70],	  [138],	  [169];	  R	  (On	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Countryside	  Alliance)	  v	  AG	  [2007]	  UKHL	  52	  [47],	  [78],	  [129],	  [155].	  
	   33	  
In	  Friend	  v	  United	  Kingdom,	   the	   Court	   considered	   claims	   relating	   to	   legislation	  prohibiting	   fox	   hunting	   and	   took	   into	   account	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   legislation	   had	  been	  adopted	  after	  extensive	  Parliamentary	  debate,	   in	  which	  various	  proposals	  had	   been	   considered	   before	   an	   outright	   ban	   on	   fox-­‐hunting	   was	   enacted.	   It	  concluded	  that	  the	  judgment	  that	  it	  was	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  to	  ban	  hunting	  was	  “one	  for	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  to	  make”.169	  	  	  While	   national	   courts	   do	   not	   need	   to	   extend	   a	   comparable	   “margin	   of	  appreciation”	  to	  the	  legislator,	  the	  idea	  that	  some	  deference	  is	  due	  to	  democratic	  institutions	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	  domestic	   case-­‐law	  on	  proportionality	  under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act.	  Thus,	   for	  example,	   in	   the	  recent	  case	  of	  Nicklinson,	  Lord	  Mance	  stated	  that	  the	  assessment	  of	  proportionality	  under	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  should	  take	  into	  account	  “institutional	  competence	  and	  legitimacy”	  and	  that,	  as	  a	  result:	  	  	   “[S]ome	   judgments	   on	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   comparative	   acceptability	   of	  differing	   disadvantages,	   risks	   and	   benefits	   have	   to	   be	   and	   are	  made	   by	  those	   other	   branches	   of	   the	   state	   in	   the	   performance	   of	   their	   everyday	  roles,	   and	   that	   courts	   cannot	   and	   should	   not	   act,	   and	   do	   not	   have	   the	  competence	  to	  act,	  as	  a	  primary	  decision-­‐maker	  in	  every	  situation.”170	  	  This	  reluctance	  to	  intervene	  will	  be	  particularly	  strong	  in	  the	  case	  of	  legislation	  that	  has	  been	   recently	  enacted	  and	  which	  has	  been	   subject	   to	  extensive	  public	  and	  Parliamentary	  discussion.171	  	  	  Property	   owners’	   reasonable	   expectations	   of	   the	   legislative	   environment	   are	  also	   relevant	   to	   the	   question	   of	   proportionality	   under	   A1P1.	   Regulatory	  interference	  is	  more	  readily	  accepted	  when	  it	   is	  predictable.	  Thus,	   for	  example,	  in	  Ian	  Edgar	  v	  United	  Kingdom,	  a	  wholesale	  distributor	  of	  firearms	  argued	  that	  it	  had	   suffered	   an	   individual	   and	   excessive	   economic	   burden	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  introduction	   of	   a	   prohibition	   on	   the	   sale	   of	   handguns.	   The	   Court	   held	   that	   the	  legislation	  did	  not	  offend	  the	  “fair	  balance”	  requirement	  under	  A1P1,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  trade	  in	  firearms	  had	  been	  subject	  to	  statutory	  control	  in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   for	   many	   years	   and	   that,	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   applicant	  company	   had	   no	   reasonable	   expectation	   that	   it	   would	   be	   able	   to	   continue	   to	  trade	  in	  any	  particular	  type	  of	  firearm.172	  Similarly,	  at	  the	  point	  when	  the	  United	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  Friend	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  16072/06	  &	  27809/08,	  24th	  November	  2009	  [56].	  See	  also	  Animal	  Defenders	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (2013)	  57	  EHRR	  21	  [116].	  170	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Nicklinson)	  v	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  [2014]	  UKSC	  38	  [166].	  See	  also	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Nicklinson)	  v	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  [2014]	  UKSC	  38	  [102]-­‐[103]	  (per	  Lord	  Neuberger);	  [231]	  (per	  Lord	  Sumption).	  Although,	  for	  the	  limits	  of	  this	  principle,	  see	  R	  (Countryside	  Alliance)	  v	  AG	  [158]	  (Lord	  Brown);	  R	  
(on	  the	  application	  of	  Nicklinson)	  v	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  [347]-­‐[348]	  (Lord	  Kerr).	  171	  See	  R	  (Countryside	  Alliance)	  v	  AG	  [2007]	  UKHL	  52,	  [2008]	  1	  AC	  719	  [45].	  172	  Ian	  Edgar	  (Liverpool)	  Ltd	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  37683/97,	  25	  January	  2000	  (admissibility).	  See	  also	  CEM	  Firearms	  Ltd	  v	  United	  Kingdom,	  37674/97	  &	  37677/97,	  26	  September	  2000	  (admissibility);	  London	  Armoury	  Limited	  v	  United	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Kingdom	   government	   first	   proposed	   standardised	   packaging	   legislation,	   the	  Industry	   could	  have	  had	   little	   expectation	   that	   its	   ability	   to	  brand	   its	   products	  would	   continue	   unchanged	   in	   future.	   The	   progressive	   eradication	   of	   smoking	  was	  an	  explicit	  goal	  of	  public	  policy173	  and,	  over	  decades,	  ever	  more	  restrictive	  controls	  on	  tobacco	  packaging	  and	  marketing	  had	  been	  introduced.	  Standardised	  packaging	   rules	   had	  been	  under	   discussion	   at	   international,	   supranational	   and	  domestic	  levels	  for	  years.	  .	  	  In	   this	   context,	   the	   Industry	   would	   appear	   to	   have	   a	   number	   of	   difficulties	   in	  arguing	  that	  the	  Government’s	  decision	  to	  proceed	  with	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	   in	  the	   face	  of	  competing	  evidence	  violates	  A1P1.	  The	   legislation	  was	  preceded	   by	   two	   full	   public	   consultation	   exercises	   and	   was	   supported	   by	   a	  review	   of	   the	   scientific	   evidence	   commissioned	   from	   an	   independent	   expert.	  Other	   policy	   options	   were	   considered	   and	   rejected.174	  The	   Regulations	   were	  tailored	  to	  meet	  the	  authorising	  purpose	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Children	  and	  Families	  Act	  2014	  and	  were	  eventually	  passed	  with	   substantial	  Parliamentary	  majorities.175	  There	  is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  the	  legislature	  sought	  to	  balance	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  health	  with	  private	  economic	  interests.176	  The	  protection	  of	  life,	  public	  health	  and	  public	  safety	  are	  considered	  to	  be	   interests	  “of	   the	  first	   importance”	  under	  the	  ECHR177	  and	  the	  Industry	  had	  clear	  notice	  of	  the	  need	  to	  accommodate	  itself	  to	  a	  hostile	  legislative	  environment.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  whatever	  one’s	  view	  of	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  legislation,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  could	   consider	   the	   legislature’s	  decision	   to	  be	   arbitrary	  or	   “manifestly	  without	  reasonable	   foundation”.	   Even	   under	   the	  more	   rigorous	   scrutiny	   of	   a	   domestic	  court,	  there	  are	  also	  strong	  reasons	  for	  believing	  that	  the	  Regulations	  would	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  A1P1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kingdom	  37666/97	  and	  others,	  26	  September	  2000	  (admissibility);	  Andrews	  v	  
United	  Kingdom,	  37657/97,	  26	  September	  2000	  (admissibility).	  173	  See,	  for	  example	  HM	  Government,	  Healthy	  Lives,	  Healthy	  People:	  a	  Tobacco	  
Control	  Plan	  for	  England,	  9	  March	  2011,	  6.	  174	  See	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  [7.4].	  175	  Members	  of	  Parliament	  voted	  367:113	  in	  favour.	  See	  Hansard,	  11	  March	  2015,	  col	  379.	  176	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  Regulations	  contain	  transitional	  provisions,	  They	  do	  not	  cover	  tobacco	  products	  that	  are	  seldom	  consumed	  by	  young	  people.	  They	  ensure	  that	  registered	  trade	  marks	  are	  not	  lost	  through	  non-­‐use	  and	  that	  branding	  signs	  can	  still	  be	  employed	  in	  a	  non-­‐consumer	  setting.	  See	  section	  1	  above.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  held	  that	  policy	  decisions	  taken	  by	  state	  contracting	  parties	  have	  violated	  rights	  protected	  under	  the	  ECHR	  where	  a	  state	  has	  made	  no	  attempt	  to	  balance	  competing	  rights	  and	  interests.	  See,	  for	  example,	  
Hirst	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (No	  2)	  (2004)	  38	  EHRR	  40	  [51].	  177	  Pinnacle	  Meat	  Processors	  Company	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  33298/96,	  21	  October	  1998.	  Under	  Art	  2,	  ECHR	  (the	  right	  to	  life),	  a	  contracting	  party	  has	  a	  positive	  obligation	  to	  take	  appropriate	  steps	  to	  safeguard	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  within	  its	  jurisdiction	  (see	  Hristozov	  v	  Bulgaria,	  47039/11	  and	  358/12,	  13	  November	  2012).	  While	  this	  obligation	  would	  not	  oblige	  a	  state	  to	  implement	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation,	  its	  existence	  ought	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  “fair	  balance”	  in	  any	  challenge	  to	  the	  Regulations.	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  It	  has,	  nevertheless,	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  Regulations	  violate	  A1P1	  because	  they	  do	   not	   compensate	   the	   Industry	   for	   interference	   with	   intellectual	   property	  rights.	  As	  noted	  above,	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  indicates	  that	  compensation	   must	   generally	   be	   paid	   where	   an	   applicant	   is	   deprived	   of	  possessions. 178 	  In	   such	   circumstances,	   there	   is	   an	   initial	   assumption	   that	  compensation	   should	   bear	   a	   reasonable	   relationship	  with	  market	   value.179	  The	  award	  of	   an	  arbitrary,	   or	   seriously	  disproportionate,	   sum	   in	   compensation	  has	  been	   held	   to	   violate	   A1P1.180	  However,	   payment	   of	   full	   market	   value	   is	   not	  always	   required,	   particularly	   where	   a	   state	   acts	   to	   achieve	   important	   policy	  goals.181	  	   In	  any	  event,	  as	  explained	  above,	  the	  Regulations	  do	  not	  “deprive”	  the	  Industry	  of	  its	  possessions	  under	  the	  Strasbourg	  system.182	  	  Compensation	  is	  not	  always	  required	  for	  a	  control	  on	  the	  use	  of	  property;183	  although	  it	  may	  play	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  See,	  for	  example,	  James	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [54];	  Lithgow	  v	  
United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  329	  [120];	  Kozacioğlu	  v	  Turkey	  (2011)	  53	  EHRR	  34	  [64].	  However,	  the	  obligation	  to	  pay	  compensation	  is	  not	  absolute.	  In	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  compensation	  has	  not	  been	  required	  for	  the	  deprivation	  of	  property.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jahn	  v	  Germany	  (2006)	  42	  EHRR	  49.	  179	  See	  Lithgow	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  329	  [121];	  Vistins	  v	  Latvia	  (2014)	  59	  EHRR	  21	  [36].	  180	  See,	  for	  example,	  Platakou	  v	  Greece	  38460/97,	  11	  January	  2001;	  Jokela	  v	  
Finland	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  26;	  Vistins	  v	  Latvia	  (2014)	  58	  EHRR	  4.	  	  181	  James	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  123	  [54];	  Lithgow	  v	  UK	  (1986)	  8	  EHRR	  329	  [121];	  Jokela	  v	  Finland	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  26	  [53];	  Broniowski	  v	  Poland	  (2006)	  43	  EHRR	  1	  [182];	  Vistins	  v	  Latvia	  (2014)	  58	  EHRR	  4	  [112];	  (2014)	  59	  EHRR	  21;	  Budayeva	  v	  Russia	  (2014)	  59	  EHRR	  2	  [180]-­‐[182].	  See	  also,	  See	  R	  (on	  
the	  application	  of	  SRM	  Global	  Master	  Fund	  LP)	  v	  Treasury	  Commissioners	  [2009]	  EWCA	  Civ	  788	  [56]	  (explaining	  that,	  in	  some	  instances,	  that	  the	  “policy	  aim	  of	  the	  measure	  in	  question	  may	  be	  diminished	  or	  undermined	  or	  even	  contradicted	  by	  a	  requirement	  of	  full	  value”).	  182	  See	  section	  5	  above.	  183	  See,	  for	  example,	  JA	  Pye	  (Oxford)	  Ltd	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  45	  [79].	  See	  also	  CEM	  Firearms	  Ltd	  v	  United	  Kingdom,	  37674/97	  &	  37677/97,	  26	  September	  2000	  (admissibility)	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  quoted	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Shadow	  Home	  Secretary	  (as	  he	  then	  was)	  explaining	  the	  consequences	  if	  compensation	  always	  had	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  those	  affected	  by	  legislation	  designed	  to	  improve	  public	  safety:	  “	  …[W]hen	  next	  we	  felt	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  improve	  public	  safety	  through	  legislation,	  whether	  in	  respect	  of	  furniture,	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry,	  the	  transport	  industry	  or	  firearms	  control,	  Governments	  and	  the	  House	  [of	  Commons]	  would	  always	  be	  constrained	  and	  often	  prevented	  from	  making	  decisions	  in	  favour	  of	  public	  safety	  by	  the	  enormous	  cost	  involved.	  Yes,	  as	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  said,	  there	  is	  a	  balance	  to	  be	  struck	  between	  individuals’	  fundamental	  freedoms	  and	  the	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  community,	  but	  in	  my	  judgment	  and	  that	  of	  my	  honourable	  Friends,	  the	  balance	  on	  this	  issue	  must	  be	  struck	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  general	  interests	  of	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole.”	  (Debate	  on	  Firearms	  (Amendment)	  Bill,	  18	  February	  1997).	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important	   role	   in	   securing	   a	   fair	   balance	   between	   the	   public	   interest	   and	  property	  right-­‐holders.	  In	  the	  Strasbourg	  case	  law,	  the	  principles	  governing	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   grant	   of	   compensation	   and	   the	   achievement	   of	   a	   fair	  balance	  are	  incompletely	  developed.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  contracting	  parties	  are	   accorded	   a	   broad	  margin	   of	   discretion	   in	   deciding	   whether	   compensation	  should	  be	  paid	  for	  interferences	  with	  property	  rights	  arising	  from	  legislation	  that	  prohibits	   activities	   deemed	   to	   be	   socially	   undesirable.	   In	   Friend	   v	   United	  
Kingdom,	  for	  example,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that:	  	   “…[A]	  ban	  on	  an	  activity	  which	  is	  introduced	  by	  legislation	  will	  inevitably	  have	  an	  adverse	   financial	   impact	  on	   those	  whose	  businesses	  or	   jobs	  are	  dependent	   on	   the	   prohibited	   activity….	   Nevertheless,	   the	   domestic	  authorities	  must	  enjoy	  a	  wide	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  determining	  the	  types	  of	  loss	  resulting	  from	  the	  measure	  for	  which	  compensation	  will	  be	  made.	   As	   stated	   in	  CEM	  Firearms	  Limited,	   ‘the	   legislature's	   judgment	   in	  this	   connection	   will	   in	   principle	   be	   respected	   unless	   it	   is	   manifestly	  arbitrary	   or	   unreasonable’.	   This	   applies,	   a	   fortiori,	   to	   cases	   where	   the	  interference	   concerns	   control	   of	   the	   use	   of	   property	   under	   the	   second	  paragraph	  of	  Article	  1	   rather	   than	  deprivation	  of	  possessions	  under	   the	  first	  paragraph	  of	  the	  Article.”184	  	  In	   that	   case,	   the	   Court	   concluded	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   compensation	   under	   the	  contested	   legislation	   was	   neither	   manifestly	   arbitrary	   nor	   unreasonable.	  Furthermore,	   it	   did	   not	   impose	   an	   individual	   and	   excessive	   burden	   on	   the	  applicants.	  Even	  where	  the	  Court	  concludes	  that	  the	  payment	  of	  compensation	  is	  necessary	   to	   secure	   a	   fair	   balance,	   there	   remains	   considerable	   leeway	   in	  identifying	  an	  appropriate	  sum.185	  	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Regulations,	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   the	   decision	   not	   to	  compensate	   the	   Industry	   from	   public	   funds	   for	   the	   loss	   of	   its	   ability	   to	   apply	  brand	  signs	  to	  tobacco	  packaging	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  either	  manifestly	  arbitrary	  or	  unreasonable.	  The	  gradual	  eradication	  of	  the	  market	  for	  tobacco	  products	  is	  a	  clear	  public	  policy	   goal	   of	  European	  and	  national	   institutions	   and	   the	   Industry	  has	   operated	   in	   an	   increasingly	   restrictive	   regulatory	   environment	   for	   many	  years.	   If	   compensation	   were	   paid	   for	   the	   loss	   of	   branding	   opportunities,	   it	   is	  likely	  that	  a	  proportion	  of	  these	  funds	  would	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  Industry’s	   commercial	   goals.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   risk	   that	  public	   policy	   goals	   would	   be	   “diminished	   or	   undermined	   or	   even	  contradicted.”186	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  Friend	  v	  United	  Kingdom	  16072/06	  &	  27809/08,	  24th	  November	  2009	  [57].	  185	  D	  Harris	  et	  al,	  Harris,	  O’Boyle	  &	  Warbrick:	  Law	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	  3rd	  ed	  (OUP,	  2014)	  890.	  Thus,	  even	  if	  compensation	  had	  been	  a	  requirement	  to	  ensure	  the	  proportionality	  of	  the	  Regulations,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  tobacco	  companies’	  prediction	  that	  “billions	  of	  pounds”	  (a	  figure	  presumably	  representing	  a	  generous	  estimate	  of	  the	  market	  value	  of	  their	  brands)	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  something	  of	  an	  over-­‐statement.	  186	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  SRM	  Global	  Master	  Fund	  LP)	  v	  Treasury	  Commissioners	  [2009]	  EWCA	  Civ	  788	  [56].	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6.2	   European	  Union	  
	  In	   EU	   law,	   the	   framework	   within	   which	   limitations	   on	   protected	   rights	   are	  considered	  is	  more	  complex.	  The	  Union	  is	  an	  economic	  legal	  order	  within	  which	  the	  protection	  of	   fundamental	   rights	  developed	  gradually	  and	   incidentally.	  The	  CJEU’s	  early,	  rather	  uncertain,	  jurisprudence	  on	  limitations	  often	  diverged	  from	  that	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court.187	  Indeed,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Treaty	  rules	  on	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  fundamental	  rights	  has	  still	  not	  been	  delineated	  with	  total	   clarity.188	  It	   must	   also	   be	   borne	   in	   mind	   that	   the	   CJEU	   does	   not	   simply	  exercise	   a	   supervisory	   jurisdiction,	   but	   has	   ultimate	   responsibility	   for	   the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Treaties	  and	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	   EU	   and	   its	   member	   states.	   Accordingly,	   it	   has	   had	   no	   need	   to	   provide	  member	   states	  with	   a	   “margin	   of	   appreciation”	   equivalent	   to	   that	   relied	   upon	  frequently	  by	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court..	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Charter	  and	  through	  a	  developing	  body	  of	   jurisprudence,	   the	   CJEU’s	   approach	   to	   limitations	   has	   become	   progressively	  more	   coherent.189	  Art	   52(1),	   the	  Charter’s	   general	   provision	  on	   limitations	  has	  offered	  an	  organising	  framework	  for	  this	  process.	  It	  states	  that:	  
 “Any	  limitation	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  recognised	  by	  this	  Charter	  must	  be	  provided	  for	  by	  law	  and	  respect	  the	  essence	  of	  those	  rights	   and	   freedoms.	   Subject	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality,	  limitations	  may	  only	  be	  made	   if	   they	   are	  necessary	   and	   genuinely	  meet	  objectives	   of	   general	   interest	   recognised	   by	   the	   Union	   or	   the	   need	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  See,	  for	  example,	  early	  cases	  on	  the	  right	  of	  property,	  such	  as	  (265/87)	  
Hermann	  Schräder	  HS	  Kraftfutter	  GmbH	  &	  Co.	  KG	  v	  Hauptzollamt	  Gronau	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237;	  (5/88)	  Wachauf	  v	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  [1989]	  ECR	  2609;	  (C-­‐293/97)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Environment	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  
Fisheries	  and	  Food,	  ex	  parte	  H.A.	  Standley	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2603	  [54]-­‐[58].	  188	  For	  discussion,	  see	  G	  Anagnostaros,	  “Balancing	  Conflicting	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  the	  Sky	  Österreich	  Paradigm”	  [2014]	  European	  Law	  Rev	  111;	  F	  de	  Cecco	  “Fundamental	  Freedoms,	  Fundamental	  Rights	  and	  the	  Scope	  of	  Free	  Movement	  Law”	  (2014)	  German	  Law	  Journal	  383;	  V	  Trstenjak	  and	  E	  Beysen,	  “The	  Growing	  Overlap	  of	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  and	  Fundamental	  Rights	  in	  the	  Case	  law	  of	  the	  CJEU”	  (2013)	  38	  European	  Law	  Rev	  293;	  S	  Peers	  and	  S	  Prechal,	  “Article	  52”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  1478-­‐9;	  N	  Nic	  Shuibhne,	  The	  Coherence	  of	  EU	  Free	  Movement	  Law:	  Constitutional	  
Responsibility	  and	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (OUP,	  2013);	  	  (C-­‐36/02)	  Omega	  Spielhallen-­‐	  
und	  Automatenaufstellungs-­‐GmbH	  v	  Oberbürgermeisterin	  der	  Bundesstadt	  Bonn	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐9609	  (Opinion	  of	  AG	  Stix-­‐Hackl)	  [48]-­‐[73].	  189	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐20	  &	  64/00)	  Booker	  Aquaculture	  Ltd	  v	  The	  Scottish	  
Ministers	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐7411;	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  
Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25.	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protect	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  others.”	  190	  	  Art	  52(1)	   is	  generally	  considered	   to	   impose	   three	  distinct	   requirements.	  These	  bear	   a	   structural	   resemblance	   to	   the	   conditions	   applied	   under	   A1P1.	   To	   be	  justified,	  interferences	  with	  protected	  rights	  must	  be	  “provided	  for	  by	  law”	  and,	  must	  serve	  an	  “objective	  of	  general	  interest	  recognized	  by	  the	  Union	  or	  the	  need	  to	  protect	   the	   rights	  and	   freedoms	  of	  others”.	  The	  condition	  of	   legality	  has	  not	  been	  analysed	   in	  detail	  by	   the	  CJEU	   in	   this	  context.191	  Indeed,	   it	  has	  often	  been	  overlooked	  entirely	  when	  the	  Court	  has	  reviewed	  the	  application	  of	   limitations	  on	  the	  application	  of	   fundamental	  rights.	  However,	   it	  can	  be	  assumed	  it	  will	  be	  interpreted	  in	  line	  with	  the	  equivalent	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court.	  As	  noted	  above,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  Regulations	  will	  surmount	  this	  hurdle.	  Similarly,	   the	   protection	   of	   public	   health	   certainly	   qualifies	   as	   an	   objective	   of	  general	  interest	  recognised	  by	  the	  Union.192	  	  A	   third	   category	   of	   conditions	   must	   also	   be	   satisfied	   under	   Art	   52(1).	  Interferences	  with	  protected	  rights	  must	  “respect	  the	  essence”	  of	  that	  right,	  must	  be	  proportionate,	  necessary	  and	  must	  genuinely	  meet	  their	  intended	  objectives.	  These	   requirements	   are	   conceptually	   connected	   and	   are	   not	   always	   clearly	  distinguished	  in	  the	  CJEU’s	  jurisprudence.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  are	  often	  considered	  together	   as	   aspects	   of	   the	   proportionality	   enquiry.	   The	   relationship	   between	  proportionality	   and	   the	   “necessary”	   and	   “genuinely	  meet”	   conditions	   is	   readily	  apparent193	  but	   Art	   52(1)’s	   requirement	   that	   the	   “essence”	   of	   a	   right	   must	   be	  respected	   demands	   further	   explanation.	   On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   the	   existence	   of	   this	  condition	   appears	   to	   indicate	   that	   all	   Charter	   rights	   have	   an	   absolute	   and	  inviolable	  core.194	  However,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  applied	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  this	  manner.	  Failure	   to	   respect	   the	   essence	   of	   a	   right	   has	   generally	   been	   treated	   as	  synonymous	  with	   disproportionality.195	  	  Where	   the	   “essence”	   requirement	   has	  been	   applied	   separately,	   the	   Court	   has	   generally	   concluded	   that	   it	   has	   been	  respected	   as	   long	   as	   the	   right-­‐holder	   is	   not	   deprived	   of	   all	   aspects	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  For	  detailed	  discussion,	  see	  S	  Peers	  and	  S	  Prechal,	  “Article	  52”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  1455-­‐1521.	  191	  For	  mention	  of	  the	  legality	  condition	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fundamental	  rights,	  see	  (C-­‐314/12)	  UPC	  Telekabel	  Wien	  GmbH	  v	  Constantin	  Film	  Verleih	  GmbH	  [2014]	  ECDR	  12	  [54];	  (C-­‐129/14	  PPU)	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  against	  Spasic	  (2015)	  2	  CMLR	  1	  [57].	  192	  See,	  TFEU,	  Art	  9.	  See	  also	  (C-­‐154/04	  &	  155/04)	  R	  (on	  the	  Application	  of	  
Alliance	  for	  Natural	  Health)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  [31];	  (C-­‐101/12)	  
Herbert	  Schaible	  v	  Land	  Baden-­‐	  Württenberg,	  29th	  May	  2013	  [35];	  (C-­‐544/10)	  
Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  [48]-­‐[49].	  193	  	  See	  (C-­‐92/09	  &	  93/09)	  Volker	  und	  Markus	  Schecke	  GbR	  9	  November	  2010	  [72]-­‐[82].	  194	  See	  R.	  Schütze,	  EU	  Constitutional	  Law	  (CUP,	  2012),	  .419.	  Cf	  F	  Wollenschläger,	  “Article	  17(1)”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  
Commentary	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2014)	  465,	  485-­‐6.	  195	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐20	  &	  64/00)	  Booker	  Aquaculture	  Ltd	  v	  The	  Scottish	  
Ministers	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐7411	  [86];	  (C-­‐544/1)	  Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  
Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  [56]-­‐[58].	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protected	   interest.196	  On	   this	   basis,	   it	   can	   be	   suggested	   that	   the	   Regulations	  would	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  Industry’s	  intellectual	  property	  rights.197	  	  More	   generally,	   the	  CJEU’s	   approach	   to	   proportionality	   is	   long-­‐established	   and	  clearly	  structured.	  The	  concept	  has	  been	  developed	  as	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law	   and	   has	   been	   applied	   in	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   legal	   contexts.	   In	   the	   recent	  judgment	   of	   Lord	   Reed	   and	   Lord	   Toulson	   in	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   R	   (on	   the	  
application	  of	  Lumsdon)	  v	  Legal	  Services	  Board,	  it	  has	  been	  described	  thus:	  	   “Proportionality	  as	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  EU	  law	  involves	  a	  consideration	  of	   two	   questions:	   first,	   whether	   the	   measure	   in	   question	   is	   suitable	   or	  appropriate	  to	  achieve	  the	  objective	  pursued;	  and	  secondly,	  whether	  the	  measure	   is	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   that	   objective,	   or	   whether	   it	   could	   be	  attained	  by	  a	   less	  onerous	  method.	  There	   is	   some	  debate	  as	   to	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  third	  question,	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  proportionality	  stricto	  
sensu:	   namely,	   whether	   the	   burden	   imposed	   by	   the	   measure	   is	  disproportionate	   to	   the	   benefits	   secured.	   In	   practice,	   the	   court	   usually	  omits	   this	   question	   from	   its	   formulation	   of	   the	   proportionality	  principle.…”198	  	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  in	  cases	  concerning	  fundamental	  rights,	  this	  principle	  requires	  	  a	   court	   applying	   EU	   law	   to	   assess	   carefully	   whether	   an	   interference	   with	   a	  protected	  right	   is	  precisely	  and	  minimally	  tailored	  to	  the	  state’s	   legitimate	  aim.	  The	   proportionality	   assessment	   also	   incorporates	   procedural	   guarantees.199	  A	  somewhat	  modified	  methodology	  is	  adopted	  when	  a	  measure	  under	  scrutiny	   is	  itself	  directed	  at	  the	  protection	  of	  a	  fundamental	  right	  or	  rights.	   In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	   CJEU	   has	   referred	   to	   the	   need	   to	   establish	   a	   “fair	   balance”	   between	  competing	  rights.200	  Such	  a	  “fair	  balance”	  approach	  inevitably	  accords	  a	  greater	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  See	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [49];	  (C-­‐293/12)	  Digital	  Rights	  Ireland	  Ltd	  v	  Minister	  for	  Communications,	  
Marine	  &	  Natural	  Resources	  8	  April	  2014	  [38]-­‐[40];	  (C-­‐544/10)	  Deutsches	  
Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  [58];	  (C-­‐314/12)	  
UPC	  Telekabel	  Wien	  GmbH	  v	  Constantin	  Film	  Verleih	  GmbH	  [2014]	  ECDR	  12	  [51];	  (C-­‐129/14	  PPU)	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  against	  Spasic	  (2015)	  2	  CMLR	  1	  [58]-­‐[59].	  For	  a	  stricter	  approach,	  cf	  Alemo-­‐Herron	  v	  Parkwood	  Leisure	  Ltd,	  18	  July	  2013	  [33]-­‐[36].	  197	  Cf	  Opinion	  of	  Lord	  Hoffmann,	  commissioned	  by	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd;	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Standardised	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  will	  Harm	  Public	  Health	  and	  Cost	  UK	  
Taxpayers	  Billions:	  a	  Response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  
Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  9	  August	  2012,	  Appendix	  5	  [7].	  198	  [2015]	  UKSC	  41	  [33].	  	  199	  See	  (C-­‐402/05P,	  415-­‐05P)	  Kadi	  ECR-­‐I	  6351	  [366]-­‐[367].	  200	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐275/06)	  Promusicae	  v	  Telefónica	  de	  España	  [2008]	  ECR	  I-­‐271	  [61]-­‐[70];	  (C-­‐70/10)	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  v	  SABAM	  [2011]	  E.C.R.	  I-­‐11959	  	  [53];	  (C-­‐314/12)	  UPC	  Telekabel	  Wien	  GmbH	  v	  Constantin	  Film	  Verleih	  GmbH	  [2014]	  ECDR	  12	  [46]-­‐[64].	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  Court	  has	  appeared	  to	  conduct	  a	  “fair	  balance”-­‐type	  analysis	  alongside	  a	  more	  orthodox	  assessment	  of	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degree	  of	   leeway	  to	  EU	  institutions	  and	  member	  states	  than	  might	  be	  available	  under	   a	   strict	   application	   of	   the	   proportionality	   principle.201	  	   This,	   then,	   is	   the	  structure	   within	   which	   the	   UK	   Government’s	   argument	   that	   any	   interference	  with	   property	   rights	   can	   be	   justified	   under	   Art	   52(1)	  will	   be	   assessed.	   On	   the	  surface,	   at	   least,	   the	   approach	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   more	   intensive	   than	   that	  adopted	  by	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  under	  A1P1.	  	  	  However,	   in	  cases	  concerning	  proportionality,	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  discretion	  has	  been	  granted	  to	  the	  EU	  legislator;	  particularly	  where	  legislation	  has	  required	  the	  making	  of	  complex	  judgments	  on	  political,	  economic	  or	  social	  issues.	  Indeed,	  in	   such	   circumstances,	   the	  Court	  has	   stated	   that	   it	  will	   only	   intervene	  where	  a	  measure	   is	   “manifestly	   inappropriate”.202	  The	   same	   degree	   of	   discretion	   is	   not	  necessarily	   available	   to	   member	   states,	   particularly	   when	   they	   derogate	   from	  protected	   internal	  market	   freedoms.	   	  Such	  a	  differential	  standard	  of	  review	  for	  proportionality	  has	  been	  justified	  by	  the	  need	  to	  promote	  harmonisation	  and	  to	  guard	  against	  disguised	  protectionism.	  203	  	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  government	  may	  not,	   on	   this	   basis,	   be	   judged	   against	   a	   “manifestly	   inappropriate”	   standard.	  Nevertheless,	   there	   are	   several	   features	   of	   the	   CJEU’s	   jurisprudence	   on	  limitations	   that	  will	  make	   it	   easier	   for	   the	   Government	   to	   sustain	   its	   claim	   on	  proportionality. 	  First,	  even	  though	  the	  standard	  of	  review	  may,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  general	  principle,	  be	   more	   intensive	   under	   Art	   17	   than	   under	   A1P1,	   the	   case-­‐law	   of	   the	   CJEU	  indicates	   that	   member	   states	   will	   be	   accorded	   a	   significant	   degree	   of	   leeway	  when	  they	  implement	  public	  health	  policies.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  areas	  in	  which	  the	   law	   has	   not	   been	   fully	   harmonised	   at	   EU	   level,	   member	   states	   have	  significant	   freedom	  to	  determine	   the	   level	  of	  public	  health	  protection	   that	   they	  wish	   to	   attain.204 	  The	   fact	   that	   other	   member	   states	   have	   not	   introduced	  comparable	   levels	   of	   regulation	   will	   not,	   in	   itself,	   mean	   that	   a	   measure	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  proportionality.	  See,	  for	  example,	  (C-­‐544/10)	  Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  
Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012;	  (C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  
Österreicher	  Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25;	  (C-­‐30/14)	  McDonagh	  v	  Ryanair	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  32.	  201	  For	  discussion,	  see	  G	  Anagnostaros,	  “Balancing	  Conflicting	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  the	  Sky	  Österreich	  Paradigm”	  [2014]	  European	  Law	  Review	  111.	  202	  See	  (C-­‐154/04	  &	  155/04)	  R	  (on	  the	  Application	  of	  Alliance	  for	  Natural	  Health)	  
v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  [52];	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  
ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453	  [59];	  (C-­‐101/12)	  Herbert	  Schaible	  v	  Land	  Baden-­‐	  
Württenberg,	  29th	  May	  2013	  [47].	  203	  See	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Lumsdon)	  v	  Legal	  Services	  Board	  [2015]	  UKSC	  41	  [37]-­‐[38].	  Although,	  as	  applied	  to	  fundamental	  rights,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  such	  a	  differential	  approach	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  true	  commitment	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  such	  rights.	  204	  Ibid	  [64];	  (C-­‐171/07	  &	  C-­‐172/07)	  Apothekerkammer	  des	  Saarlandes	  v	  
Saarland	  and	  Ministerium	  für	  Justiz,	  Gesundheit	  und	  Soziales	  [2009]	  ECR	  I-­‐4171;	  (E-­‐16/10)	  Phillip	  Morris	  Norway	  AS	  v	  Norway,	  12	  September	  2011	  [80].	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disproportionate.	  205	  Furthermore,	  many	  of	   the	  principles	   that	   the	  CJEU	  applies	  in	   scrutinising	   EU	   legislation	   in	   this	   area	   ought	   also	   to	   be	   relevant	   to	   any	  challenge	   to	   the	   Regulations.	   Public	   health	   and	   safety	   remain	   interests	   of	  “foremost”	  significance,	  whether	  pursued	  by	  the	  EU	  institutions	  or	  by	  a	  national	  law-­‐maker.206	  Member	  states	  ought	   therefore	   to	  benefit	   from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  “precautionary	  principle”	  without	  risking	  retrospective	  criticism	  when	  they	  intervene	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   imperfect	  scientific	  evidence.207	  They	  ought	  also	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  firm	  steps	  to	  combat	  well-­‐known	  threats	  to	  public	  health	  and	  safety,	  such	  as	  alcohol	  and	  tobacco	  consumption	  and	  gambling.208	  	  	  The	   Charter	   itself	   incorporates	   a	   right	   to	   healthcare	   (Art	   35),	   which	   provides	  that:	  	   “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  preventive	  health	  care	  and	  the	  right	  to	   benefit	   from	  medical	   treatment	   under	   the	   conditions	   established	   by	  national	  laws	  and	  practices.	  A	  high	  level	  of	  human	  health	  protection	  shall	  be	  ensured	  in	  the	  definition	  and	  implementation	  of	  all	  Union	  policies	  and	  activities.”	  209	  	  
	  Under	  the	  Charter,	  this	  right	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  right	  of	  solidarity	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  fundamental	  freedom	  under	  the	  Charter	  and	  does	  not	  therefore	  have	  equivalent	  status	  to	  the	  right	  of	  property	  within	  the	  European	  legal	  order.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  fact	  that	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  second	  sentence	   of	   Art	   35	   means	   that,	   when	   considering	   the	   compatibility	   of	   the	  Regulations	   with	   Art	   17,	   a	   court	   applying	   EU	   law	   will	   be	   obliged	   to	   consider	  whether	  a	  “fair	  balance”	  has	  been	  struck	  between	  competing	  rights,	  rather	  than	  simply	   to	   apply	   a	   strict	   analysis	   of	   proportionality.	   The	   CJEU	   has	   already	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  (C-­‐36/02)	  Omega	  Spielhallen-­‐	  und	  Automatenaufstellungs-­‐GmbH	  v	  
Oberbürgermeisterin	  der	  Bundesstadt	  Bonn	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐9609	  [38];	  (C-­‐390/12)	  
Proceedings	  brought	  by	  Pfleger	  [2014]	  3	  CMLR	  47	  [85];	  (E-­‐16/10)	  Phillip	  Morris	  
Norway	  AS	  v	  Norway,	  12	  September	  2011	  [80].	  	  206	  (C-­‐421/09)	  Humanplasma	  v	  Austria	  [2010]	  ECR	  I-­‐12869	  [32](and	  cases	  cited	  in	  that	  paragraph);	  (E-­‐16/10)	  Phillip	  Morris	  Norway	  AS	  v	  Norway,	  12	  September	  2011	  [77];	  (C-­‐210/03)	  The	  Queen,	  on	  the	  application	  of	  Swedish	  Match	  AG	  v	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  [2004]	  ECR	  I-­‐11893	  [56];	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  
for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453	  (Opinion	  of	  AG	  Geelhoed)	  [229].	  207	  See	  (E-­‐16/10)	  Phillip	  Morris	  Norway	  AS	  v	  Norway,	  12	  September	  2011	  [82]-­‐[83].	  While	  a	  member	  state	  would	  have	  to	  furnish	  evidence	  permitting	  a	  court	  to	  conclude	  that	  legislation	  is	  proportionate,	  it	  may	  not	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  scientific	  reports	  (see	  (390/12)	  Pfleger,	  ibid	  [50)-­‐[51]).	  208	  See	  (C-­‐544/10)	  Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  [48]-­‐[49].	  209	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  rights	  to	  health	  and	  healthcare	  in	  the	  EU	  legal	  order,	  see	  T	  Hervey	  &	  J	  McHale,	  “Art	  35	  -­‐	  the	  Right	  to	  Health	  Care”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2014)	  951;	  T	  Murphy,	  Health	  &	  Human	  Rights	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2013).	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recognised	   that	   such	   a	   “fair	   balance”	   analysis	   is	   appropriate	   when	   an	  interference	  with	  protected	  rights	  aims	  to	  secure	  interests	  in	  public	  health.	  210	  	  The	   importance	   of	   the	   contested	   right	   is	   also	   relevant	   to	   an	   assessment	   of	  proportionality	   under	   EU	   law. 211 	  As	   has	   been	   seen,	   states	   are	   afforded	   a	  particularly	  broad	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  in	  regulating	  the	  use	  of	  property	  rights	  under	   A1P1.	   A	   similar	   principle	   applies	   in	   EU	   law,	   although	   it	   has	   not	   been	  acknowledged	  so	  overtly.	  In	  upholding	  interferences	  with	  the	  right	  of	  property,	  the	   CJEU	   has	   repeatedly	   noted	   that	   property	   has	   a	   “social	   function”.	   Thus,	   for	  example,	  in	  	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT,	  it	  stated	  that:	  	  	   “[T]he	   Court	   has	   consistently	   held	   that,	   while	   [the	   right	   of	   property]	  forms	   part	   of	   the	   general	   principles	   of	   Community	   law,	   it	   is	   not	   an	  absolute	   right	   and	   must	   be	   viewed	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   social	   function.	  Consequently,	   its	   exercise	   may	   be	   restricted,	   provided	   that	   those	  restrictions	   in	   fact	   correspond	   to	   objectives	   of	   general	   interest	   pursued	  by	   the	   Community	   and	   do	   not	   constitute	   a	   disproportionate	   and	  intolerable	   interference,	   impairing	   the	   very	   substance	   of	   the	   rights	  guaranteed.”212	  	   The	   identification	  of	   this	   functional	  basis,	   suggests	   that	  Art	  17	   is	   a	   tool	   for	   the	  achievement	  of	  social	  goals	  rather	  than	  a	  guarantee	  of	  absolute	  control.213	  From	  this	   perspective,	   some	   forms	   of	   property,	   and	   some	   exercises	   of	   the	   right	   of	  property,	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  valued	  more	  highly	  than	  others.	  	  	   The	  CJEU	  has	  identified	  important	  social	  and	  economic	  functions	  for	  intellectual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  CJEU	  has	  relied	  on	  Art	  35	  in	  performing	  such	  a	  “fair	  balance”	  assessment,	  see	  (C-­‐544/10)	  Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  
Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  [45]-­‐[47].	  211	  See	  (C-­‐293/12)	  Digital	  Rights	  Ireland	  Ltd	  v	  Minister	  for	  Communications,	  
Marine	  &	  Natural	  Resources	  8	  April	  2014	  [37],	  [48].	  212	  (C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453	  [149].	  See	  also,	  for	  example,	  (265/87)	  Hermann	  Schräder	  HS	  Kraftfutter	  GmbH	  &	  
Co.	  KG	  v	  Hauptzollamt	  Gronau	  [1989]	  ECR	  2237	  [15];	  (C-­‐280/93)	  Germany	  v	  
Council	  [1994]	  ECR	  I-­‐4973	  [78];	  (C-­‐293/97)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  
Environment	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries	  and	  Food,	  ex	  parte	  H.A.	  
Standley	  [1999]	  ECR	  I-­‐2603	  [54];	  (C-­‐155/04)	  Alliance	  for	  Natural	  Health	  [2005]	  ECR	  I-­‐6451	  [126];	  	  (C-­‐347/03)	  Regione	  autonoma	  Friuli-­‐Venezia	  Giulia	  [2005]	  ECR-­‐I	  3785	  [119];	  (C-­‐210/03)	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Swedish	  Match	  AB)	  v	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  [72];	  (C-­‐20	  &	  64/00)	  Booker	  Aquaculture	  Ltd	  v	  The	  
Scottish	  Ministers	  [2003]	  ECR	  I-­‐7411	  [68].	  	  	  213	  The	  right	  to	  conduct	  a	  business	  (Art	  16)	  has	  also	  often	  been	  described	  as	  having	  a	  “social	  function”.	  Less	  often,	  the	  functional	  approach	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  other	  rights.	  See	  (C-­‐92/09	  &	  93/09)	  (C-­‐92/09	  &	  93/09)	  Volker	  und	  Markus	  
Schecke	  GbR,	  9	  November	  2010	  [48].	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  approach	  should	  now	  pass	  into	  a	  “dignified	  retirement”	  (see	  S	  Peers	  and	  S	  Prechal,	  “Article	  52”	  in	  S	  Peers	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights:	  a	  Commentary	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2014)	  1478-­‐9)	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property	  rights.	  It	  has,	  for	  example,	  noted	  that	  the	  functions	  of	  trade	  marks:	  	   “…include	  not	   only	   the	   essential	   function	  of	   the	   trade	  mark,	  which	   is	   to	  guarantee	   to	   consumers	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   goods	  or	   services,	   but	   also	   its	  other	  functions,	  in	  particular	  that	  of	  guaranteeing	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  goods	  or	   services	   in	   question	   and	   those	   of	   communication,	   investment	   or	  advertising.”214	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Industry’s	  marks,	  the	  “essential	  function”	  of	  designating	  origin	  is	  preserved	  under	  the	  Regulations.215	  Brand	  and	  variant	  name	  will	  continue	  to	  be	   applied	   in	   text	   on	   the	   packaging	   of	   tobacco	   products.	   By	   contrast,	   the	  “communication,	   investment	   [and]	   advertising”	   functions”	   of	   the	   marks	   are	  seriously	   curtailed.	   However,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   tobacco	   products,	   these	   extended	  functions	  are	  of	  questionable	  social	  value.216	  The	  Industry’s	  branding	  is	  designed	  to	  attract	  customers	  and,	  as	  such,	  has	  an	  aim	  that	  is	  directly	  opposed	  to	  EU	  and	  member	   state	   public	   health	   policies,217	  which	   aim	   to	   reduce,	   and	   ultimately	  eradicate,	   tobacco	   use.218 	  In	   such	   circumstances,	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   “social	  function”	  approach	  to	  the	  right	  of	  property,	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  absolutist	  view	  of	  the	   right,	  makes	   it	  much	  more	   likely	   that	   the	   Regulations	  will	   be	   regarded	   as	  compatible	  with	  Art	  17.	  
	  It	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  features	  of	  the	  CJEU’s	  jurisprudence	  which	   will	   ease	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   Government’s	   burden	   in	   responding	   to	   a	  challenge	  under	  Art	  17.	  A	  national	   court	   implementing	  EU	   law	  will	   certainly	  be	  required	   to	   review	   the	   rationality	   and	   procedural	   propriety	   of	   the	   decision	   to	  introduce	   standardised	   packaging	   legislation.	   It	   will	   also	   have	   to	   consider	  whether	  the	  domestic	  legislator	  has	  taken	  steps	  to	  limit	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  the	  Regulations	   on	   the	   Industry	   wherever	   possible.	   The	   existence,	   or	   absence,	   of	  checks	   and	   safeguards	   has	   often	   been	   crucial	   in	   the	   CJEU’s	   assessment	   of	  proportionality. 219 	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Regulations,	   the	   extended	   legislative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  (C-­‐487/07)	  L’Oréal	  v	  Bellure	  NV	  [58].	  	  215	  Specific	  functions	  have	  also	  been	  identified	  for	  copyright,	  designs	  and	  patents.	  However,	  they	  have	  no	  played	  as	  significant	  a	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  law	  at	  European	  level.	  216	  More	  generally,	  some	  trade	  mark	  scholars	  have	  criticised	  the	  identification	  of	  these	  “functions”	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  introduce	  unhelpful	  uncertainty	  into	  the	  law.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Max	  Planck	  Institute	  for	  IP	  and	  Competition	  Law,	  Study	  
on	  the	  Overall	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Trade	  Mark	  System,	  15	  February	  2011,	  103-­‐105.	  217	  The	  Court	  acknowledged	  a	  similar	  danger	  in	  the	  encouragement	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  gambling	  market	  (C-­‐390/12)	  Proceedings	  brought	  by	  Pfleger	  [2014]	  3	  CMLR	  47	  [46].	  218	  See	  Art	  168(5)	  TFEU.	  For	  discussion	  of	  EU	  policy	  relating	  to	  tobacco	  control,	  see	  P	  Cairney	  et	  al,	  Global	  Tobacco	  Control	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012)	  72-­‐98.	  219	  See,	  for	  example,	  ((C-­‐491/01)	  R	  v	  Secretary	  for	  State	  for	  Health	  ex	  p	  BAT	  [2002]	  ECR	  I-­‐11453;	  C-­‐92/09	  &	  93/09)	  Volker	  und	  Markus	  Schecke	  GbR	  9	  November	  2010	  [79]-­‐[86];	  (C-­‐544/10)	  Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐
Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  ;(C-­‐283/11)	  Sky	  Österreich	  GmbH	  v	  Österreicher	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Conclusion	  –	  keeping	  things	  in	  proportion	  
	   The	  Industry	  has	  acknowledged	  no	  doubts	  in	  arguing	  that	  the	  Regulations	  violate	  the	  European	  right	  of	  property.	  However,	  as	  has	  been	  seen,	  its	  claim	  is	  very	  far	  from	  accurate.	  Even	  if	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation	  is	  held	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	   Industry’s	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   it	   will	   not	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	  deprivation	  of	  intellectual	  property	  under	  A1P1	  or	  Art	  17.	  As	  a	  regulation	  on	  the	  use	   of	   possessions,	   there	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   strong	   chance	   that	   the	  Regulations	  will	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   justified	   response	   to	   a	   serious	   public	   health	  problem.	  While	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  predict	   the	  outcome	  of	  any	  proportionality	  assessment	   on	   the	   facts,	   the	   principles	   outlined	   above	  mean	   that	   the	   Industry	  will	  be	  fighting	  an	  uphill	  battle	  in	  arguing	  that	  the	  Regulations	  do	  not	  achieve	  a	  fair	  balance	  between	  competing	  rights.	  This	   conclusion	  ought	  not	   to	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  The	   idea	   that	  a	  widely-­‐supported	  public	  health	  measure	  might	  not	  be	  	  implemented	   because	   it	   would	   restrict	   the	   fundamental	   right	   of	   tobacco	  companies	  to	  apply	  branding	  to	  product	  packaging	  is	  instinctively	  unappealing.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  idea	  has	  been	  circulated	  so	  widely	  despite	  its	  many	  weaknesses	  bears	   testimony	   to	   the	   controversial	   lobbying	   power	   of	   the	   Industry. 220	  	  However,	   it	   also	   reveals	   something	   significant	   about	   the	   “IP	   Community”.	  Lawyers	   and	   other	   IP	   professionals	   have	   played	   a	   prominent	   (and	   sometimes	  controversial)	   role	   in	   the	   campaign	   against	   standardised	   packaging	   laws.221	  	  Within	  the	  culture	  of	  this	  Community,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  intellectual	  property	  has	  come	  increasingly	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  inviolable.	  In	  lobbying	  on	  the	  Regulations,	  right-­‐holders	   referred	   without	   irony	   or	   embarrassment	   to	   their	   “fundamental	  right	   to	   differentiate	   our	   brands	   from	   those	   of	   our	   competitors”. 222	  Extraordinarily,	  it	  has	  even	  been	  suggested	  that,	  while	  a	  state	  might	  lawfully	  ban	  smoking,	   the	   right	   of	   intellectual	   property	   prevents	   it	   from	   introducing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rundfunk	  [2013]	  2	  CMLR	  25	  [61]-­‐[63];	  (C-­‐314/12)	  UPC	  Telekabel	  Wien	  GmbH	  v	  
Constantin	  Film	  Verleih	  GmbH	  [2014]	  ECDR	  12;	  (C-­‐461/10)	  Bonnier	  Audio	  AB	  v	  
Perfect	  Communication	  Sweden	  AB,	  19	  April	  2012.	  	  	  	  220	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  Industry’s	  lobbying	  see,	  RN	  Proctor,	  Golden	  Holocaust:	  
Origins	  of	  the	  Cigarette	  Catastrophe	  and	  the	  Case	  for	  Abolition	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2012);	  T	  Cave	  &	  A	  Rowell,	  A	  Quiet	  Word:	  Lobbying,	  Crony	  
Capitalism	  &	  Broken	  Politics	  in	  Britain	  (Bodley	  Head,	  2014).	  221	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Ireland’s	  submission	  to	  the	  legislative	  consultation	  on	  the	  Irish	  standardised	  packaging	  legislation.	  See	  “Plain	  Packaging,	  Conflicts	  of	  Interest	  and	  the	  Law	  Society”,	  19	  August	  2014,	  http://aclatterofthelaw.com/2014/08/19/plain-­‐packaging-­‐conflicts-­‐of-­‐interest-­‐and-­‐the-­‐law-­‐society/	  	  222	  See	  Imperial	  Tobacco,	  “Statement	  on	  UK	  Plain	  Packaging”,	  11	  March	  2015.	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standardised	   packaging	   legislation	   falling	   short	   of	   total	   prohibition.223	  These	  claims	   are	   striking	   in	   the	   disproportionate	   significance	   they	   accord	   to	   the	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property.	  	  Suggestions	  that	  particular	  policy	  options	  cannot	  be	  pursued	  because	  they	  would	  contravene	   the	   fundamental	   right	   to	   intellectual	  property	  within	   the	  European	  legal	  order	  have	  become	  relatively	  commonplace.224	  They	  are	  often	  self-­‐serving	  and	  are	  almost	  always	  advanced	  without	  detailed	  reference	  to	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  or	  the	  CJEU.225	  On	  close	  examination,	  they	  often	  prove	  to	  be	  over-­‐stated	  or	  positively	  misleading.	  Nevertheless,	   there	   is	   a	   real	   risk	   that	   they	  will	  have	  an	  unjustified	  impact	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  policy.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	   this	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   Industry’s	   challenge	   to	   the	  Regulations	  will	  not	  only	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  standardised	  packaging,	  but	  will	  also	  serve	  to	  foster	  greater	  scepticism	  of	  all	  such	  claims	  based	  on	  the	  fundamental	  right	  of	  intellectual	  property	  under	  A1P1	  or	  Art	  17.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  223	  Opinion	  of	  Lord	  Hoffmann,	  commissioned	  by	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd;	  Philip	  Morris	  Ltd,	  Standardised	  Tobacco	  Packaging	  will	  Harm	  Public	  Health	  and	  Cost	  UK	  
Taxpayers	  Billions:	  a	  Response	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  Health	  Consultation	  on	  
Standardised	  Packaging	  of	  Tobacco	  Products,	  9	  August	  2012,	  Appendix	  5	  [20].	  Cf	  (C-­‐544/10)	  Deutsches	  Weintor	  eG	  v	  Land	  Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  6	  September	  2012	  [57]-­‐[58].	  224	  In	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  see,	  for	  example,	  UK	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office,	  
Government	  Response	  to	  the	  Consultation	  on	  Reducing	  the	  Duration	  of	  Copyright	  in	  
Certain	  Unpublished	  Works,	  29	  January	  2015,	  4;	  R	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  British	  
Academy	  of	  Songwriters,	  Composers	  &	  Authors	  v	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
Business,	  Innovation	  &	  Skills	  [2015]	  EWHC	  1723	  (Admin)	  [133],	  [143],	  [147].	  225	  Cf	  Lord	  Hoffmann,	  Philip	  Morris	  Opinion:	  “The	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  ECHR	  on	  A1P1	  is	  complicated	  and	  I	  do	  not	  think	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  subject	  it	  to	  prolonged	  analysis.”	  [8]	  	  
